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his EAP completes 31 years 
and includes “items of interest” 
and “citations received.” Archi-
tect and sacred geometer Keith 
Critchlow died in London in April; see an 
“in memoriam” on p. 4. Note the flower 
photographs from his last book—The Hid-
den Geometry of Flowers (2011)—right. 
We include two “book notes,” the first 
focusing on philosopher Dermot Moran’s 
study, Husserl’s Crisis of the European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-
nology (2010). We highlight philosopher 
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic’s The Wonder 
of Water (2020), an edited collection ex-
amining how human experience relates to 
decisions about water. 
This EAP includes four essays. Toronto-
nian Robert Fabian provides an update on 
downtown neighborhood planning in his 
city. Second, philosopher John Russon 
explores the ambiguity of travelling to a 
foreign place. Third, independent re-
searcher Stephen Wood writes about two 
contrasting modes of science teaching—
what he calls “knowledge-based learning” 
vs. “understanding-based learning.” 
Some readers will remember that, in the 
last four EAP issues, we have run a series 
of essays on Goethean science by the late 
science educator Henri Bortoft. Several 
readers requested that we integrate the four 
entries into one, which we have done in 
this issue. By far this is the longest essay 
EAP has ever run; we are honored to in-
clude it because Bortoft’s work offers an 
unusual new manner of understanding, 
grounded in “authentic wholeness.” We 
thank Jacqueline Bortoft for allowing us 
to include the full essay here. 
 
Right: Photographs from Keith Critch-
low’s The Hidden Geometry of Flowers 
(2011, p. 181). These flowers, representing 
“five-ness” geometrically, are among the 
most common of British wildflowers. See 
the “in memoriam” for Critchlow on p. 4. 
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Place and COVID-19 
As we continue to be threatened by the 
pandemic, one wonders whether and how 
the human relationship with place will 
change. As phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty emphasized, intercorpore-
ality—i.e., human bodies together in phys-
ical space—is an integral aspect of human 
being. How this key social need is to be re-
integrated via social distancing and volun-
tary isolation is a difficult question that 
may or may not find a workable answer. 
One of the most astute commentators on 
COVID-19 is Andrew Sullivan, former 
blogger and columnist for New York Mag-
azine. His recent takes on the pandemic 
have been especially perceptive and, be-
low, we reproduce a portion of the NYM 
column he wrote for Friday, May 15, 2020. 




None of us has any solid notion yet of 
quite how transformative our current 
plague will be…. But one thing really 
does seem clear. All the trends in the 
culture that have led us to withdraw 
physically from one another, to live in 
an online space, to replace real life 
with virtual existence: These shifts 
have all been artificially accelerated. 
    The essential socializing mecha-
nisms of school and college, from kin-
dergarten onward, have evaporated 
overnight. Religious practice, for so 
long a communal and physical thing, is 
suspended in midair, the sacraments 
withheld, the rituals that bind us to-
gether as Christians or Jews or Mus-
lims and connect us to the past aban-
doned. 
    Workplaces, our other major forum 
for socialization, have disappeared into 
thin air, as Zoom meetings proliferate, 
and we live in a Brady Bunch square 
set onscreen. Public transport that 
forced us to interact with one another 
daily continues for essential workers—
but in a far more attenuated way for 
most white-collar and affluent Ameri-
cans, further dividing classes. 
    Doctors diagnose through screens; 
therapists are on speaker phones; 
friends are on FaceTime and nowhere 
else. Evolving media technologies that 
were slowly gaining speed have been 
suddenly sucked from the future into 
the present…. 
    The struggle of small, local retail 
stores, already pummeled by Amazon, 
gets more intense and doomed each 
day. And they are not just economic 
units: They’re social ones. They’re 
where we see neighbors and strangers 
and friends. 
    The collective human experience of 
a football or basketball game cannot be 
replicated in an empty stadium; the co-
median cannot bring people together 
around a joke that ends in silence; the 
dates we once had—for a play or a 
movie or a concert—have had to end. 
In a crisis of loneliness, we have some-
how managed to make life lonelier 
still. 
    The restaurants that have helped re-
generate neighborhoods and sustain 
new communities are being culled at a 
terrifying rate. The bars where we 
flirted; the coffee shops where we 
worked and chatted; the gyms where 
we recognized familiar faces: These 
are all in suspension, underlining mo-
dernity’s already dehumanizing soli-
tude. 
    Even family life, which is an essen-
tial base for so much of our social ac-
tivity, can’t play the role it should. 
Packing everyone into the same space 
all day and night, with no outlet for 
others, is a recipe for marital failure 
and family suffocation. The abuse of 
spouses and children this crisis has en-
abled will echo into the future. 
    Extramarital sex has gone com-
pletely virtual—an ephemeral series of 
online flirtations and porn fantasies. 
We barely even acknowledge one an-
other in supermarkets, our faces 
masked, our hands in gloves, our dis-
tance nervously kept. Social media— 
the addictive, distractive habit we were 
trying to get some handle on—is now 
the only real-time socialization we 
have. After some success at weaning 
myself off my phone, I’ve never spent 
so much time on it. 
    This is not so far, it seems to me, a 
revolutionary moment for change away 
from our recent past. At least not yet. 
It’s more like a fast-forward of existing 
trends, a speeding up of social atomiza-
tion, even as the cultural wreckage re-
mains. 
    Perhaps this will in turn prompt a re-
action and help us restore the human to 
our world. But humans adjust, and this 
time we have had to adjust very 
quickly. The tools we have used to 
keep going in this era will surely re-
main in our hands—we will get used to 
them, and, in turn, we will get attached 
to them. Insofar as they have made 
businesses more efficient, or our own 
lives simpler, they’ll stick. 
    The quiet out there that seemed so 
shocking only a month ago now seems 
much more familiar. What we needed, 
in some ways, for our collective mental 
health, was a catalyst for greater physi-
cal socialization, more human contact, 
and more meaningful community. 
What we’re getting, I fear, is the oppo-
site. 
 
Items of interest 
The editors of Phenomenology + Practice 
are producing a special issue entitled 
“Practices of Phenomenological and Artis-
tic Research.” The prospectus reads that 
the aim is to move “beyond traditional 
views of the relationships between art and 
phenomenology by considering both as 
fields of research, or more specifically, as 
ways of researching through phenomena.” 
The focus is “research practices developed 
through the influence, combination or even 
hybridization of phenomenological and ar-
tistic approaches.” Contacts: info@alex-
arteaga.ne; emma.cocker@ntu.ac.uk. 
 
The Journal of Civic Architecture is a 
peer-reviewed effort presenting creative 
work “oriented toward city life.” One focus 
is “creative life in the city, in the everyday 
world of work and human being….” The 
journal is published by London’s Ca-
nalside Press. www.canalsidepress.com. 
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Patrick Lynch, 2017. Civic 
Ground: Rhythmic Spatiality 
and the Communicative 
Movement between Architec-
ture, Sculpture and Site. Lon-
don: Artifice Books. 
 
This British architect criticizes the conven-
tional modernist comparison of buildings 
with sculptures and instead argues for an 
understanding grounded in “rhythmic spa-
tiality,” which situates the designed thing 
in relation to a shifting physical setting and 
civic context. This book is complemented 
by an earlier edited collection entitled 
Memesis (Artifice Books, 2015); this ear-
lier volume include entries by Lynch, Al-
exandra Stara, David Grandorge, Peter 
Carl, and Laura Evans. 
 
James M. Magrini, 2019. Ethi-
cal Responses to Nature’s 
Call: Reticent Imperatives. 
NY: Taylor & Francis. 
  
This philosopher argues “for a renewed 
view of objects and nature” and “considers 
how it is possible to understand our ethical 
duties—in the form of ethical intuitional-
ism—to nature and the planet by listening 
to and releasing ourselves over to the call 
or address of nature.” 
 
Tim Patterson & John Buech-
senstein, eds., 2018. Wine 
and Place: A Terroir Reader, 
Berkeley: Univ. of California 
Press. 
  
In studies of “sense of place,” one of the 
most intriguing and applicable notions is 
the French terroir—the claim that the 
unique quality of a particular wine is a 
product of its place qualities, including nat-
ural (soil, topography, drainage, weather, 
and climate) and human aspects (the care 
of vineyards and the craft of winemakers). 
In this edited collection, a winemaker 
(Patternson) and wine educator (Buechsen-
stein) assemble a wide-ranging set of read-
ings arguing for and against the reality of 
terroir. The following sidebar includes the 
opening passage from their introduction. 
 
The earthly link in wine 
The notion of terrior is at the heart of 
what makes wine special. No other 
foodstuff, no other agricultural com-
modity, grips the human imagination 
with such immeasurable force as a 
great wine from a great growing area. 
    When you taste a great wine, it 
seems inevitable that a connection ex-
ists between those inimitable flavors 
and the particulars of that place—the 
soil, the climate, the elevation, the as-
pect, the parcel’s unique position on 
the hill or in the vale. 
    No other connection between food 
and place has inspired as extensive a 
body of literature as the earthly link in 
wine. Many agricultural products ex-
hibit some degree of regional and sub-
species variation, but since wine in-
volves a dramatic transformation of 
raw grapes through fermentation, the 
lingering pedigree of origin is all the 
more remarkable. 
    Wine is unique, and terrior is the 
reason. The Greeks and Romans had 
wine gods; there is no record of any 
deity responsible for, say, Vidalia on-
ions, tasty as they are (p. 1). 
 
 
Christopher Tilley, ed., 2019. 
London’s Urban Landscape: 
Another Way of Telling. Lon-
don: Univ. College London 
Press. 
 
In the field of anthropology, Christopher 
Tilley is perhaps the foremost advocate of 
a phenomenological perspective. The 
chapters in this volume are said to “stress 
the significance of place and the built envi-
ronment to the urban landscape.” The em-
phasis is “phenomenological thinking 
[that] presents fine-grained ethnographies 
of the practices of everyday life in Lon-
don.” The ten chapters focus on residential 
and public places. Entries include: 
“Change and continuity in a  central Lon-
don street” (Ilaria Pulini); “Towards a 
phenomenology of the concrete mega-
structure: Space and perception at the 
Brunswick Centre, London” (Clare 
Melhuish); “Isolation: A walk through a 
London estate” (Dave Yates); “Liminality 
and the carnivalesque in Smithfield An-
tiques Market”; “Holland Park: An elite 
London landscape” (Christopher Tilley); 
and “Observation and selection: Objects 
and meaning in the Bermondsey Antique 
Market” (Dave Yates). 
The following sidebar highlights selec-
tions from Tilley’s Preface. 
 
Another way of telling 
This book aims at least partially, and in 
an exploratory way, fill two gaps in the 
literature: (a) the paucity of thick eth-
nographic description of place in Lon-
don; and (b) discussion of the material 
significance of the places forming Lon-
don’s urban landscape in relation to 
everyday life. Filling them amounts to 
“another way of telling” about the city, 
the subtitle of this book…. 
    Each chapter discusses and analyzes 
a particular place in the city. The 
places discussed … were chosen to 
represent a wide a range of different 
places as was possible in the scope of a 
short book. The individual discussions 
range from streets to housing estates to 
markets and parks, from living on a 
houseboat to the rhythms of a taxi 
rank, to the material politics of graffiti 
and street art (pp. xiii–xiv).   












In Memoriam: Keith Critchlow (1923–2020) 
rchitect and sacred geometer 
Keith Critchlow died on 
April 8, 2020, in Kingston-
Upon-Thames, London. He 
was 87 years old and a co-founder of the 
Temenos Academy, a group focusing on 
education in philosophy and the arts in the 
light of Eastern and Western sacred tradi-
tions. 
Critchlow studied at the Summerhill 
School and the Royal College of Art. 
Originally trained as a classical painter, 
he wrote many books on the lived quali-
ties of geometry, including Order in 
Space (1969), Islamic Pattern as a Cos-
mological Art (1976), Time Stands Still 
(1979), Islamic Art and Architecture: 
System of Geometric Design (1999), and 
The Hidden Geometry of Flowers: Living 
Rhythms Form and Number (2011; see 
sidebars below and next page). 
Critchlow’s professional posts in-
cluded lectureship at London’s Architec-
tural Association School of Architecture 
and professorship at London’s Islamic 
Art at the Royal College of Art. He 
founded the School of Visual Islamic and 
Traditional Arts (VITA) in 1984, which 
moved from the Royal College of Art to 
The Prince Charles’ Institute of Architec-
ture in 1992–1993, where Critchlow was 
director of research. 
This institute later became the Prince’s 
Foundation, within which the School of 
Traditional Arts was housed. Critchlow 
was a professor emeritus at VITA and 
served as director for research. He also 
taught at the Prince’s Foundation for the 
Built Environment in London. 
Critchlow was an expert in sacred ar-
chitecture and sacred geometry and 
founded Kairos, a society which studies 
and promotes traditional values of art and 
science. Critchlow’s architectural work 
included the Krishnamurti Study Centre 
in England; the Lindisfarne Chapel in 
Crestone, Colorado; and The Sri Sathya 
Sai Institute of Higher Medical Sciences 
in Puttaparthi, India. 
    In his memory, we reprint items from 
his last major work, The Hidden Geome-
try of Flowers (2011). 
—David Seamon 
 
Below: Examples of flowers with nine, ten, 
eleven, and twenty-one petals: “Names are 
important but here we wish to focus on other 
aspects of the flowers” (p. 185).                                                                            
The hidden geometry of  
flowers 
This book, like the flowers them-
selves, speaks primarily in the lan-
guage of images. It also follows a 
four-layered structure. These can be 
called points of view. The first looks 
into the tangible structure of flowers, 
the second takes account of the social 
value flowers have for us. The third 
concerns the symbolic or cultural use 
of flowers. The fourth celebrates the 
inspirational effect flowers have on 
us. All four are integral as well as ex-
isting within their own separate con-
texts. 
    This is not an ‘easy read’ book that 
follows a single flow of reasoning 
from start to finish. On the contrary, it 
is composed of insights as well as 
outsights, focusing on how we regard 
flowers. It is designed to encourage 
all who read it to look at flowers in a 
new way. There are also pauses, dur-
ing which the reader is encouraged to 
turn to the nearest flower and contem-
plate it and hopefully see it anew. 
    The illustrations are hand-drawn by 
the author. Geometry can be consid-
ered from at least three viewpoints. 
First, as a technical exercise mostly 
serving industrialization. Secondly, as 
a purely mathematical function. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, as a 
science of the soul. This has to be per-
formed with the human hand and is 
fundamental to a deeper understand-
ing of the Platonic wisdom tradition. 
Geometry is only fully understood by 
doing it. 
    None of the ideas here are dog-
matic or fixed, but rather an offering 
for consideration. We have been 
guided ourselves by the truth of flow-
ers, their beauty and what makes them 
so important to us—maybe they are 
also our teachers of the time-honored 
objective truths of number, geometry, 
harmony, and wholeness (p. 15). 
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On the symmetry of flowers 
Symmetry must rank highly as one of 
the chief mysteries in [life’s] impulse 
for order…. Flowers express a pleth-
ora of beautiful symmetries ranging 
from the twofold to the manifold. The 
most predominant symmetry, particu-
larly in wildflowers, is fivefold …. 
    There is more than a single way to 
measure the geometry of a flower and 
its petals. Not only does each petal 
have its own characteristic profile and 
curvature, but the ensemble of the 
petals is what we call the flower. This 
collective geometry includes the total 
symmetry. [For example, there are] 
three-petalled flowers such as the 
Snowdrop, the Tulip, the Iris, and the 
Lily…. 
   Next, there are some very beautiful 
fourfold flowers [such as] the Clema-
tis, the Balloon Flower, and the beau-
tifully fragrant Wallflower…. Next, 
we come to the most frequently oc-
curring symmetry in wildflowers: the 
fivefold or pentagonal symmetry. The 
list is impressive and includes the 
original Dog Rose…, the Buttercup, 
the Herb Robert, the Periwinkle, Bor-
age, and soon. 
    Six-ness is found in the Daffodil, 
whose flowers fuse into its hexagonal 
shaft. [Critchlow goes on to highlight 
examples of seven-ness, eight-ness, 
nine-ness, ten-ness, eleven-ness, 
twelve-ness, and twenty-one-ness—
the last illustrated in the Daisy family] 
(pp. 173, 174, 177–78, 181). 
 
                                                                           
The importance of geometry 
Geometry is a universal, objective 
language and is the study of the order 
in space…. This, in turn, brings us to 
two most fundamental tools for bring-
ing the laws of geometry into experi-
mental consciousness: these are the 
compasses (or dividers) and the 
straight edge (or square). They are 
likely the most ancient and revered of 
all scientific instruments. They em-
body actualities that can express “ab-
solutes” symbolically and directly. 
    These two tools guide the human 
hand into the realm of objective uni-
versality. This is in contrast to what is 
called “freehand” drawing, which is 
completely subject to the will and 
skill of whosoever’s hand holds the 
pen or pencil. 
    “Freehand” work … is totally rele-
vant to the psyche but is of a different 
order from expressing and experienc-
ing geometric graphics. The word 
“participation” was very popular with 
the later Platonic philosophers such as 
Proclus, Iamblichus, and Plotinus. 
This refers to practices—both theoret-
ical and operative—where the human 
concerned becomes the instrument 
participating in a higher or superior 
intelligence…. 
    The Pythagoreans, we assume, first 
posited that education should best be 
founded in the four unfoldings of 
number. First, pure number becomes 
arithmetic; second, number in space is 
geometry; third, number in time is 
considered to be music or harmony; 
fourth, number in space and time be-
comes astronomy, cosmology, or 
spherics. 
    We advocate that all might “partici-
pate” in the art/science of geometry… 
We are under the complete guidance 
of the movement of the compasses as 
well as the rigorousness of following 
the discipline of the straight edge (or 
ruler). With geometry, we “partici-
pate” in the timeless truths of the 
products of “straightness” or “round-
ness.” Socrates affirmed that geome-
try was the “art of the ever true” (pp. 
291–92). 
 
Image, right, above: Critchlow’s drawing of the underlying geometry of the 
Forget-Me-Not. 
 
Image, right, below, a photograph of one Forget-Me-Not flower with an  
overlay of its underlying geometry. Critchlow writes: “The geometry of this 
remarkably proportioned small flower is startling in its conformity to pen-
tagonal symmetry. The centre of this flower is a decagon or ten-pointed 
white star. The parallel white extension [Critchlow has drawn in three of 
these parallel black lines in the flower’s geometric rendition] can be de-
rived from the central star pentagon” (p.226). 
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Dermot Moran, 2012. Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phe-
nomenology [Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts]. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
f all the phenomenological 
philosophers writing today, 
Dermot Moran, is one of the 
most knowledgeable, accessi-
ble, and prolific. His Introduction to Phe-
nomenology (Moran 2000) is an ap-
proachable overview of the history and 
styles of phenomenology and phenome-
nologists. His article-length introductions 
to phenomenology offer direct and under-
standable venues for newcomers, particu-
larly researchers who are not philoso-
phers (see references below). Two of his 
most informative writings are review arti-
cles that explore the lived body and habit-
uality in phenomenology founder Ed-
mond Husserl’s writings (Moran 2011, 
2014). 
In Husserl’s Crisis, a volume in Cam-
bridge University Press’ “introductions to 
key philosophical texts,” Moran offers an 
“explanatory and critical introduction” to 
Husserl’s last work, partly published in 
1936 and today “acknowledged as an en-
during masterpiece” (p. x). In his intro-
duction, Moran described Crisis as: 
 
A disrupted, partially published and ulti-
mately unfinished project, written when 
its author was in his late 70s, struggling 
with declining health and suffering under 
the adverse political conditions imposed 
by the German National Socialist Regime 
that had come to power in 1933. 
The Crisis is universally recognized as 
his most lucidly written, accessible and 
engaging published work, aimed at the 
general educated reader as an urgent ap-
peal to address the impending crises—
scientific, moral, and existential—of the 
age. Husserl is writing with the authority 
of a lifetime of practice as a phenomenol-
ogist and with a fluidity previously not 
found in his tortured prose. There is the 
strong sense of a philosopher with a mis-
sion, a mission to defend the very rele-
vance of philosophy itself in an era de-
fined both by astonishing scientific and 
technological progress and by political 
barbarism. 
The Crisis is also, undoubtedly, Hus-
serl’s most influential book, continuing to 
this day to challenge philosophers reflect-
ing on the meaning of the achievements of 
the modern sciences and their transform-
ative impact on human culture and on the 
world as a whole. The Crisis of the Euro-
pean Sciences is by any measure, a work 
of extraordinary range, depth and intel-
lectual force ( pp. 1–2). 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of Husserl’s Crisis are 
an overview of the philosopher’s life and 
writings, including a thorough history of 
Crisis’s genesis and publication trajec-
tory. Moran then devotes six chapters to 
Crisis’s key themes and arguments, in-
cluding “Galileo’s revolution and the ori-
gins of modern science,” “the crisis in 
psychology,” “Husserl on history,” “Hus-
serl’s problematic conception of the life-
world,” and “phenomenology as tran-
scendental philosophy.” 
In his last chapter, Moran discusses the 
significance of Crisis today, concluding 
that, “even in its incomplete and program-
matic form, the Crisis is a remarkable and 
visionary work—a work that analyses the 
past history of philosophy only in order to 
understand its future mission” (p. 297). 
Drawn from Moran’s text, the sidebars 
below highlight Husserl’s understanding 
of phenomenology as philosophy, em-
bodiment, lifeworld, and natural atti-
tude—all crucial concerns for environ-
mental and architectural phenomenology. 
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The Crisis claims to offer an introduc-
tion to transcendental phenomenol-
ogy, and, of course, Edmund Husserl 
is best known for founding and devel-
oping the new science of phenome-
nology, developing an insight into the 
intentionality, or directedness, of con-
scious experiences that had been pro-
posed by his teacher Franz Brentano 
(1838–1917). 
    Phenomenology, as developed by 
Husserl and furthered by his stu-
dents… and followers… quickly es-
tablished itself as the dominant philo-
sophical approach on the European 
continent in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. Indeed, phenomenology 
continues to hold its own as a move-
ment of international significance, 
both within Continental philosophy 
and also as a specific outlook and 
methodological approach to human 
subjectivity in the cognitive and 
health sciences. 
    Phenomenology may be character-
ized broadly as the descriptive science 
of consciously lived experiences and 
the objects of those experiences, de-
scribed precisely in the manner in 
which they are experienced (Moran 










On embodiment (Leiblichkeit) 
We cannot leave the discussion of 
pure psychology without discussing 
the theme of lived embodiment, which 
is one of Husserl’s great contribu-
tions. Despite being framed in the 
metaphysical language of the “incar-
nation (Verkörperung) of souls,” his 
thinking about embodiment or 
“livedbodiliness” is strikingly origi-
nal…. (p. 129). 
 
The live body (Leib) is experienced, 
as Husserl puts it, as a series of “I 
can’s.” I am, as he puts it, an “ego of 
abilities or capacities” (Ich der Ver-
mögen) I can turn my head and look 
around, moving my eyes, shifting my 
upper body. All these bodily move-
ments belong to and enable percep-
tion to take place. 
    The living body is both literally and 
figuratively the centre of my experi-
ences and the means of my perceptual 
encounter with the world. It is an “or-
gan of perception”; it is experienced 
as a living, functioning tool, but one 
that, in normal situations, does not 
call attention to itself. It becomes ob-
trusiveness only if something goes 
wrong, e.g., I move my head, but my 
neck is stiff; I touch something with a 
blister on my finger. 
    All forms of ego-relatedness to the 
world are mediated through my body; 
even abstract thought (consider Ro-
din’s sculpture The Thinker). I am al-
ways related to things as lifting, car-
rying, holding, reaching for, standing 
back from and so on. 
    The body is not a passive centre of 
experiences but a locus for action and 
self-directed movement. In this sense, 
the lived body is never absent from 
the perceptual field—a point which is 
later repeated by Merleau-Ponty…. 
(p. 130). 
 
This experienced and experiencing 
body, Husserl claims, as mediator of 
our experienced world, has never 
been the proper subject of any science 
before phenomenology. Husserl is 
surely right there is no one science 
that addresses the lived body as expe-
rienced—such science would include 
all forms of bodily experience, what 
Husserl calls somatology in Ideas III. 
The anorexic’s peculiar sense of her 
own body would have to come into 
play here, as well as the experiences 
of athletes or dancers. 
    Empirical psychology, due to its 
method, has treated [the lived body] 
in an objectivist and piecemeal man-
ner. The manner in which a living 
body is spatio-temporally localized 
and is involved in a living relationship 
with causality differs greatly from the 
body understood purely as a physical 
entity (p. 131). 
 
 
On the lifeworld 
[Husserl understands the] lifeworld as 
a horizontal structure, one that in-
cludes contexts, possibilities, tem-
poral distantiations which are intui-
tively experienced and can never be 
objectified in science. Rather than be-
ing an extant totality of things, the 
lifeworld is actually a “horizon” that 
stretches from indefinite past to indef-
inite future and includes all actualities 
and possibilities of experience and 
meaningfulness. The lifeworld pro-
vides a living context or “world-hori-
zon” (Welthorizont) which precisely 
makes humans human. 
    Natural life is characterized by 
Husserl as “mundane” or “worldly.” 
For Husserl, as for Heidegger (whose 
equivalent concern is “being-in-the-
world”), human beings are beings 
who essentially live immersed 
(Dahinleben) in a world understood 
as a vaguely defined context of mean-
ing and action. Heidegger himself 
states that it has become common-
place to say that humans require a 
“surrounding world” or “environ-
ment” (Umwelt), but the deeper onto-
logical meaning of this statement is 
not appreciated—to be in a world is 
an a priori character of human exist-
ence… 
    Husserl’s version of this claim is to 
speak of natural “world-life 
(Weltleben), and indeed he character-
izes humans as essentially belonging 
to the world, as being, in his phrase 
“children of the world” (Weltkinder), 
a term not used in the Crisis itself but 




On the obviousness of lifeworld 
and natural attitude 
Husserl introduces the natural attitude 
as the commonsense outlook of naïve 
realism with which humans of all cul-
tures and in all periods of history nor-
mally engage with the world. People 
live in a distinctly personal and inter-
personal social communal world, sur-
rounded by other human beings and 
within social, historical and cultural 
groupings. 
    Although this is obvious to the or-
dinary person in the street, this “obvi-
ousness” has in the past not been in-
terrogated by science or by philoso-
phy. Moreover, there are remarkable 
features to this supposed “obvious-
ness” or “taken-for-grantedness” of 
our social and communal world. 
    First of all, there is the sense of the 
unity of world, its “tendency to con-
cordance” (Einstimmigheit), that is, to 
unfold in consistent, harmonious 
ways. There is also the sense of hori-
zon, the manner in which all experi-
ence… is against a backdrop of co-in-
tended meanings. There is the sense 
of a visual and spatial world beyond 
what is immediately seen, the sense of 
the stability of objects despite the 
passing of time, the sense of the conti-
nuity of experience and personal iden-
tity across time, and so on. 
    The contemporary positive sciences 
assume (with the Kantians) that the 
real world is the world of physical 
forces, spatio-temporal objects and so 
on. But living humans experience a 
somewhat different and, for them, no 
less real world which has within it 
such entities as persons, animals, 
tools, works of art, money and so on. 
    Husserl recognizes that all of these 
“senses” or meanings are not just en-
countered “ready-made” in the world 
but are always experienced as already 
unified (pp. 273–74). 
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s illustrated by her Safeguard-
ing Our Common Future 
(2000), philosopher Ingrid 
Leman Stefanovic has been a 
central figure facilitating research in en-
vironmental phenomenology. 
In Safeguarding, Stefanovic discussed 
ways to allow our world, especially, the 
natural world, to become a place sustain-
able and sustaining for both present and 
future generations. Her aim was to point 
toward an environmental understanding 
that might illuminate the “referential 
whole within which we are situated.” 
Stefanovic argued that the basis for eth-
ical actions must shift from an emphasis 
on “traditional liberal attitudes and self-
determined concerns of autonomous indi-
viduals” to a recognition that, through the 
ontological primary of place, “individual 
human beings are fundamentally already 
emplaced in a complex array of sociocul-
tural, economic, technological, regula-
tory, and environmental relationships.” 
The 12 chapters of WONDERS pin-
point Stefanovic’s ethical and moral con-
cerns in relation to water, the landscapes 
of water, and places associated with wa-
ter, whether river, bay, sea, or otherwise. 
As editor, her aim is to incorporate think-
ing that highlights “the genuine meaning 
of water in its visceral quality, its vitality 
and its primordiality.” The volume’s con-
tributors are said to: 
 
move us beyond statistics and calcula-
tions, helping us to see water differently 
and behave more discerningly in respect 
of water.... [M]ight a deeper, embodied 
vision of the wonder of water inspire 
more throughout policies? Could our 
built places be more wisely designed if we 
attended to water’s lessons in a more 
meaningful way? In recalling the full 
depth of the lived experience of water, is 
it possible to rethink the meaning of water 
ethics, a new and growing field of study 
unto itself? (pp. 3–4). 
 
Stefanovic organizes the 12 chapters of 
the volume in terms of three major parts: 
first, the lived experience of water; sec-
ond, the relationship between water and 
places; and, third, rethinking water pol-
icy, practice, and ethics. 
Part I includes ecologist Stephan Har-
ding’s “Water Gaia: Towards a Scientific 
Phenomenology of Water”; pedagogue 
Stephen J. Smith’s “Flow Motions 
and Kinetic Responsiveness”; philoso-
pher David Abram’s “Creaturely Migra-
tions on a Breathing Planet”; and environ-
mental educator Martin Lee Mueller’s 
“When Salmon Are Deemed Superflu-
ous: Reflecting on a Struggle of Stories.” 
Part II includes philosopher Janet 
Donohoe’s “The Place of Water”; philos-
opher Irene J. Klaver’s “Engaging the 
Water Monster of Amsterdam: Meander-
ing Towards a Fair Urban Riversphere”; 
Stefanovic’s “Water and the City: To-
wards an Ethos of Fluid Urbanism”; and 
philosopher Sarah J. King’s “What 
We’re Talking about When We’re Talk-
ing about Water: Race, Imperial Politics, 
and Ruination in Flint, Michigan.” 
Part III includes philosopher Bryan 
Bannon’s “The Bonding Properties of 
Water: Community, Urban River Resto-
ration, and Non-Human  Agency”; phi-
losophers Trish Glazebrook and Jeff 
Gessas’ “Standing Rock: Water Protec-
tors in a Time of Failed Policy”; philoso-
pher Henry Dicks’ “Phenomenology, 
Water Policy, and the Conception of the 
Polis”; and philosopher Robert Muger-
auer’s “Towards a Complexity Ethics: 
Understanding and Action on Behalf of 
Lifeworld Well-Being.” 
The sidebars below include passages 
from Mueller’s article on past and present 
situations where salmon have been 
deemed “superfluous and in the way of 
industry” (p. 58). 
 
Salmon as symbol 
The dismantling of the two Elwha 
dams [two hydroelectric dams built in 
the Pacific Northwest in the 19th cen-
tury; before their construction, the 
Elwha River was one of the few rivers 
in the contiguous United States to 
house all of the anadromous salmon 
and trout species native to the Pacific 
Northwest] marks a concrete politi-
cal act of restoring a landscape, but it 
also marks an important sym-
bolic gesture: the dismantling of the 
dams has initiated a re-examination of 
the various peoples’ complicated rela-
tionship with the larger living com-
munity, and salmon are increasingly 
recognized as being the keystone to 
this inter-ethnic work of restoring. 
    They are being recognized as crea-
tures deeply entangled not only with 
the ecology but also with the mind of 
the Pacific Rim. Salmon are beings of 
flesh, blood, intention, sentience, and 
intelligence, but they are also sym-
bolic creatures, totemic beings who 
nourish the human imagination with 
insights, metaphors, wonder. 
    The Elwha case symbolizes defi-
ance, determination, and also love for 
the strange and exuberant otherness of 
the salmon. And it symbolizes a striv-
ing to recreate a more complex, recip-
A 
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rocal, integrated, and beautiful rela-
tionship between humans and the 
more-than-human world. 
    There, as elsewhere across the Pa-
cific Northwest, people are asking: 
What are the needs of the salmon in 
these streams? What are the needs of 
those rivers, and the many other crea-
tures that depend on salmon flesh for 
their lives? 
    Further: How can the multi-ethnic 
groups of humans inside the many 
watersheds live in such a way that 
they once again become accomplices 
of the land, rather than disturbances? 
    Those are questions one now en-
counters again and again across 
Salmon Nation, and the chorus of de-
fiant and devoted voices who chal-
lenge the anthropocentric story is still 
swelling to a crescendo (pp. 63–64). 
 
Life wants to live 
It bears repeating: Voices that con-
tinue thinking of salmon as inconven-
ient disturbances to industrial devel-
opment are not uttering inalienable 
truths; their claims to legitimacy are 
not unchallengeable. 
    They may—while conflicts still 
flare up—co-opt such notions as sus-
tainability or even responsibility but 
they cannot, once and for all, contain 
the persistent upwelling of wonder in 
the encounter with wildness, or block-
ade the spawning, sprouting, birthing, 
and hatching of new life, or obstruct 
the instant and intuitive recognition of 
kinship between fly fisher and 
salmon, or seal the countless ways in 
which our breathing bodies still re-
spond alertly, and competently, to the 
voices of river, wind, or estuary. 
    Our mindful bodies are still being 
drawn toward, called upon, awak-
ened, stirred, and roused by rainstorm, 
solstice, or autumn moon, by moose 
or beaver or wolf; still salmon radiate 
a particularly vigorous eloquence and 
enflame a special kind of awe in us, 
charging encounters between our 
kinds, now as ever, with [a] pro-
foundly erotic tension.... 
    These are dynamics worth taking 
seriously for that which keeps surging 
and leaping and running up against 
the physical and metaphysical dams 
of the human-centered lifeworld is 
none other than life itself, raucous, 
untamable life, wanting to live. 
    This may be warning or pledge, de-
pending on where our allegiances lie: 
Life will not be contained or owned. 
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his is a report on my journey to a 
new urban place. Fifty years ago 
my wife and I moved to To-
ronto’s Bloor West neighbor-
hood. It wasn’t all that fancy a neighbor-
hood, at least not back then. The retail strip 
along Bloor between High Park and Jane 
Streets provided the place that anchored 
the neighborhood. That retail strip of sev-
eral local stores delivered a village retail 
presence, offering all the necessities and a 
few of the luxuries. 
As we approached retirement age, a 
downtown condominium augmented by a 
country cottage became increasingly at-
tractive and, almost 20 years ago, we 
moved to a condo in downtown Toronto lo-
cated on the edge of the Church Wellesley 
neighborhood—Toronto’s first “gay” 
hood. The neighborhood was anchored in 
the village retail strip located along Church 
Street between Dondonald and Alexander 
Streets. Again, all the necessities and a few 
of the luxuries were offered by smaller lo-
cal retail stores along that strip of Church. 
Fast forward to today. Retail has been 
transformed by big-box stores and online 
sales. When we moved downtown, there 
were five stores offering food along the 
Church Street strip. Today, there is one re-
maining food store, but within walking dis-
tance, there are six supermarkets, includ-
ing a flagship Loblaws located in the old 
home of the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey 
team. Loblaws is two blocks south of the 
old Church Street retail area. 
Something similar seems to have hap-
pened along the Bloor West retail strip. 
The retail strips which provided a central, 
natural place for our old and new neighbor-
hoods have faded. They haven’t become 
placeless, but they no longer engage resi-
dents the same way that the old retail strips 
provided such natural defining places for 
their neighborhoods and their residents. 
Simultaneous with these declining 
places, the population of our downtown 
neighborhood is skyrocketing. Within just 
a few blocks of our condo, there are more 
than 20 new residential towers built, going 
up, planned, or discussed. These towers 
range from a “short” 26 storeys to more 
than 80 storeys. A typical floor will have 
10 or more residential units. A typical unit 
will be home to 1.5 people. In just a few 
years, there will be thousands of new resi-
dents in our part of Toronto. 
Shortly after we moved to Toronto, ge-
ographer Edward Relph identified the 
placelessness that often accompanies life 
in the suburbs or in residential towers [1]. 
There is now a growing literature on the 
human importance of having a neighbor-
hood place that can anchor residents to 
where they live and to the communities 
which critically define their local social re-
ality. 
A lack of place can be felt in our neigh-
borhood today. Add thousands of new res-
idents, and the lack of place will be felt 
much more acutely in the future. The her-
itage folks stridently defend the architec-
tural spaces formerly holding the village 
retail that was the heart of many older 
neighborhood places. But preserving the 
spaces that held village retail isn’t nearly 
enough to preserve village retail. Big-box 
stores will continue to attract a growing 
share of the spending for necessities. 
Online sales will continue to undercut the 
high margin sales that were so important to 
the economic reality behind village retail. 
On the other side of Yonge Street from 
our condo (in Bay Cloverhill) there is an 
interesting opportunity to do something 
about local placelessness. There are three 
short side streets and a service lane within 
a larger block bounded by bus and subway 
transit lines. Toronto and other cities have 
identified the potential value of what is 
called “Shared Space” streets and lanes. 
The idea is almost a return to the early days 
of the twentieth century when all public-
realm users had equal access to streets, 
roads and lanes. We’re calling it a “Living 
Urban Block,” with intended pedestrian-
priority designation on the side streets and 
lanes. 
 
Creative city building 
I started my professional life in mathemat-
ics. I took great comfort in the universality 
of mathematical truth. Mathematical laws 
had universal applicability. Things got a bit 
muddy as I studied computability in grad-
uate school. That focus led me to computer 
science, where the value of computing was 
critically dependent on context. There are 
few important computing processes uni-
versally relevant and valuable. For me, 
what followed was a natural transition to 
the “real world” of management and sys-
tems consulting, where context was key. 
In retirement, I started to pay attention to 
urban planning. Given that we were living 
in downtown Toronto where there are 
more tall-building-construction cranes 
than any other North American city, this 
interest was a natural step. Early on, I was 
forced to recognize that there are precious 
few universal truths in the behavioral sci-
ences. What was true for undergraduate 
students in psychology courses had little 
useful relevance for retirees living in 
downtown Toronto. That led me to a 
recognition of and respect for a phenome-
nological approach to urban planning. The 
need is not urban engineering but creative 
city building. 
The placelessness challenge of today’s 
downtown Toronto is merely an aspect of 
a broader concern for social infrastructure 
[2]. Toronto does a reasonable job engi-
neering the city’s services infrastructure, 
with dozens of departments reviewing new 
development proposals. Thus far the city 
has not paid much explicit attention to the 
changes required in its social infrastructure 
to accommodate the thousands of new res-









I look back on mathematics’ universal 
truths and wish there were similar univer-
sal social-infrastructure truths. What will it 
take for the thousands of people moving 
into the dozens of new residential towers in 
my neighborhood to feel that they are part 
of a “real” neighborhood and can draw on 
the support of their local community? The 
absence of old-fashioned “village” retail 
places is bound to have an impact. Could a 
shared public realm substitute for these re-
tail places and provide the space that ena-
bles residents to recognize a defining place 
for their neighborhood? 
That question and a raft of similar ques-
tions cannot have definitive answers. It 
would depend on the new and old resi-
dents. It would depend on the larger social, 
economic, and political climate. It would 
depend on the public and private third 
spaces that are connected to potential 
neighborhood places. It would depend on 
the formal and informal events that take 
place in the available spaces. And those are 
just the initial dependencies that come to 
mind.  
 
Making it happen 
Urban planning in Toronto (and I suspect 
elsewhere as well) moves at a slow and of-
ten ponderous pace. There are plans to up-
date Yonge Street, the city’s central north-
south street. In many parts of Toronto’s 
downtown, services infrastructure is more 
than a century old and needs upgrading. A 
major study has begun. Some of the early 
ideas have been quite attractive, but it’s 
likely to be a decade or more before my lo-
cal section of Yonge Street is transformed 
into a more pedestrian-friendly place. At 
that point, all possible sites will be occu-
pied, and there will be virtually no new de-
velopment opportunities in the area. 
A recent master’s professional report by 
Berkeley graduate student Sarah Saviskas 
provides a useful summary of shared space 
or what she calls “pedestrian-priority 
streets” [3]. There is a growing recognition 
that motor vehicles do not need to automat-
ically be given street priority, especially on 
lanes and side streets. Cities throughout the 
world are taking steps to regain a balanced 
use of pedestrians and vehicles on selected 
roadways. Many of these initiatives in-
volve major transit routes, with streetcars 
or buses given exclusive use of some of the 
roadway. This approach makes transporta-
tion sense—the limited public realm can be 
more efficiently used by dedicating a por-
tion as exclusively for public transit. 
The use of pedestrian-priority streets 
considered in Saviskas’ study is different. 
Her focus is providing spaces that would 
be transformed into meaningful places for 
the new neighborhoods being crammed 
into downtown Toronto. The old-village 
retail model for a meaningful neighbor-
hood place is less and less tenable. Retail 
has changed and is changing enough that 
successful retail primarily needs a service 
rather than a geographic focus. But retail, 
especially third-space retail, can play a 
meaningful role in the establishment of 
neighborhood places linked to pedestrian-
priority streets. 
There’s a commercially attractive oppor-
tunity to integrate shared streets as new 
residential towers are completed and 
brought to market. Advertising a new de-
velopment as “a vital part of the new 
neighborhood being developed in ...” 
should, almost certainly, translate into 
faster, higher margin sales and rentals. 
Such an advertising push makes sense and 
encourages the change in mind set that 
might transform shared-space streets into 
identifiable neighborhood places. 
The time to act is now. Just across Yonge 
Street from our condo is a modest mixed-
use area bounded by transit routes on all 
sides. There are seven new residential tow-
ers completed, being constructed, or 
planned. Soon there will be no potential 
development sites remaining. 
Developers generally like the idea of 
shared-space streets. The local Downtown 
Yonge Business Improvement Area likes 
the idea. The central YMCA would love to 
see the neighborhood defined by a shared-
space street immediately north of its build-
ing and adjacent park. In addition, there are 
significant voices in the local urban plan-
ning establishment who are active support-
ers. 
The effort will extend over multiple 
phases. An initial phase could put in place 
temporary indicators of shared-space in-
tent. Perhaps eliminate most of the on-
street parking, square the corners at inter-
sections, and put in place some planned all-
season events. These possibilities are sim-
ilar to how Toronto approached changes in 
some of its high-transit-volume streets. 
With a demonstrated initial success, plans 
could be developed for a permanent con-
version of the first side street to pedestrian- 
priority designation. Initial plans could be 
developed for conversion of additional 
side streets and lanes. 
One “official” step is critical. The city 
needs to designate an experienced planner 
as the person in charge of this initiative. 
Fortunately, there are several planners ap-
proaching retirement who would look fa-
vorably on such an assignment. There are 
reasons to be cautiously optimistic that 
such an appointment will be made and that 
the neighborhood stakeholders will sup-
port the initiative. Conversion of the side 
streets will be an important step toward 
maintaining the local social infrastructure 
in the face of a massive increase in the 
number of local residents. It’s what the city 
should be doing. 
 
Notes 
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here is an ambivalence at the 
heart of dating. 
On one hand, much of the ex-
citement and energy of dating 
comes from the fact that one is venturing 
into an unknown terrain, hoping to make a 
connection with someone unfamiliar, 
someone from a different world. Each per-
son here is a kind of alien surface to the 
other, exciting in part, no doubt, because 
one can imaginatively write whatever one 
likes on that blank slate. And this alien-
ness of the other is also a matter of risk, for 
the person one connects with may be un-
pleasant, or, worse, violent; and this dan-
ger, too, is no doubt part of the thrill of the 
situation—as long as that danger does not 
in fact turn into a reality. 
On the other hand, the excitement also 
comes from the possibility that something 
further will come from the date, and a new 
relationship will develop. In that future, 
those involved will become familiar to one 
another, and the interaction will not be a 
matter of engaging with what each imagi-
natively projects on the other but will be a 
matter of both parties learning who the 
other is in a process of mutual adaptation. 
In this case, one does not want the other 
simply to be an unresisting “blank slate,” 
but to be someone specific—someone who 
offers one a new home into which one can 
precisely retreat from the demands of con-
stant engagement with an alien world and 
a supportive platform from which to ven-
ture forth rather than a surface upon which 
to project. The other here is more a beacon 
than a mystery and harbors a promise ra-
ther than a threat. 
The ambivalence of dating, then, is that 
one’s desire demands that the other be both 
alien and familiar, both an open possibility 
and a closed actuality, both a thing of the 
momentary present and an enduring real-
ity. 
Travelling to a foreign place presents a 
similar ambivalence. On one hand, the ex-
citement that white American tourists 
might feel in crossing from McAllen, 
Texas, to Reynosa in Mexico, comes 
largely from Reynosa’s reputation as a ma-
jor site for the drug-trade and the 
knowledge (or the imagination) that, in-
deed, one might be kidnapped, and part of 
the pleasure in the activity of visiting is the 
relief of getting out again successfully. 
Here, it is the dangerous unfamiliarity of 
the place that is exciting, and one enjoys 
the voyeuristic pleasure of brushing up 
against that world while still relying on the 
comforting assurance that one can return to 
the familiar world of the U.S. On the other 
hand, a different American traveler might 
well visit Istanbul, not with such voyeuris-
tic intent, but with the hope of encounter-
ing a cultural world that is differently ori-
ented and richer than the pre-packaged and 
commodified world of the United States—
a world that might broaden one’s horizons 
and, indeed, offer one a new home. 
There is something honest about the da-
ting situation. The desire associated with 
the possibly threatening mystery of the 
other is a kind of recognition of the other-
ness of other people—of the fact, that is, 
that they are not the same as oneself. The 
desire to engage with that other is a desire 
to go beyond one’s home and to have that 
breath of outside air breathe life into one’s 
world—to make one feel alive. 
The engagement with a challenging out-
side is integral to the very meaning of “liv-
ing,” and one can feel that one “doesn’t 
have a life” in the absence of such outside 
stimulation. At the same time, we have a 
desire to settle, and the experience of the 
other as a repository for one’s hope is a 
recognition of the other as harboring the 
possibility of, essentially, giving one back 
to oneself: of allowing one to feel recon-
ciled with oneself and whole. If we are 
only ever exposed to the challenging out-
side without ever being able to “come in 
from the cold,” we are worn down, and we 
feel as empty on the inside as we feel im-
poverished on the outside when we are 
without “a life.” 
The other with whom we settle allows us 
to feel anchored in the world, to have a re-
ality of our own that endures despite what-
ever happens “outside.” In the ambiva-
lence of dating, then, we see the essential 
two-directedness of our engagement with 
others: we have a trajectory toward en-
gagement with the outside and a trajectory 
toward the establishment of an inside. The 
contradictory paths in dating reflect a ten-
sion at the heart of our existential condi-
tion. 
That tension is evident in the situation of 
border-crossing as well. In the simple de-
sire to see something different and exotic, 
or even in the more extreme situation of 
wanting to be close to danger, there is, 
again, an honesty to both the recognition 
that an other culture is other, and the recog-
nition that there is something satisfying in 
seeing a reality beyond the horizon of our 
familiar world that does not answer to its 
terms. 
Whether one is simply enjoying an allur-
ing view or seeking the rush of excitement 
that comes from flirting with danger, the 
contact with the exotic alien acknowledges 
the novelty and difference of the world be-
yond one’s limits, even as it stays closely 
tethered to the reassuring support of the fa-
miliar. And yet, the very recognition that 
there is a tantalizing world beyond one’s 
own can itself, by underlining the limits of 
one’s own world, lead one to realize that 
one could live otherwise: those others, 
though exotic and threatening to oneself, 
are not exotic and threatening to them-
selves; on the contrary, for those others, 
their ways are precisely what is familiar. 
T 
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Indeed, the strange other, while offering 
the momentary pleasure of a fascinating 
spectacle, also promisingly invites one to 
change one’s own life and live otherwise. 
Thus, in the experience of the “threat” of 
the other, one is not just feeling the danger 
that one might be subjected to violence but 
also feeling the allure of giving oneself up 
to it and coming to be at home in what was 
formerly strange. 
Like dating, then, visiting another cul-
ture engages the ambivalence in our desire: 
we seek to maintain distance from an alien 
world that offers us an entertaining specta-
cle that ultimately reassures us of our sense 
of home; simultaneously, we feel the call 
to liberate ourselves from the familiar and 
become someone new. This, too—this ten-
sion between the desire for a reassuring fa-
miliarity and the desire for an unpredicta-
ble transformation—is a tension at the 
heart of our existence. 
The heartbeat that keeps the organism 
alive has a systolic and a diastolic phase. 
The systole is when the heart contracts, 
pumping oxygen-rich blood to all the parts 
of the body; the diastole is when the heart 
relaxes after contraction and allows the re-
turn of oxygen-depleted blood for replen-
ishment. Biologically, the human life de-
pends on this heartbeat. Existentially, the 
human life depends on the systole and di-
astole of being exposed and being at home. 
We humans need a home, which is both 
a physical setting dedicated to our own 
needs and a set of human relationships ori-
ented to our wellbeing. “Home” is the 
world organized in a way that recognizes 
us as uniquely important, the world as inti-
mate and close. Without a home, one has 
nothing else and no one other than oneself 
alone to establish a sense of one’s reality 
and worth, and that is a lonely and arid ex-
istence, unsettled and unsettling. Without a 
home, the world is overwhelming and un-
relenting in its indifference to us. 
Home-life on its own can be stifling, 
though; as the Buddha says, “house life is 
crowded and dusty; going forth is wide 
open” (Middle Length Discourses, 1.240). 
We need a home, but we also need a world 
beyond—the world of the real—that pre-
cisely does not relate to us intimately and 
recognize us as uniquely important. This is 
the world of engagement, the objective 
world upon which we work and the public 
world within which we earn recognition 
for our accomplishments. It is precisely a 
world in which we can be someone beyond 
who we are for our intimates. The need for 
both intimacy and indifference and the 
back-and-forth between them is the systole 
and diastole of our existential health, our 
vitality. 
The back-and-forth between intimacy 
and indifference presumes the existence of 
a border between them, and in dating, as in 
politics, it is important to establish borders. 
In dating, one is engaging with another and 
it is not yet decided whether or not one 
wants to go further with that other. Conse-
quently, it is important to be able to say 
“no.” Indeed, the desire to develop some-
thing further with that other will likely be 
dependent upon the experience that that 
other precisely respects one’s limits. 
In that sense, the development of a fur-
ther intimate relationship is not an effacing 
of borders but a richer reality built from 
them. In politics, too, borders reflect the 
fact that people in groups, like individuals, 
do not all choose to live the same way, and 
there is good reason to allow different 
groups their integrity. Whether between 
people or between cultures, borders pre-
cisely reflect the fact that we are different 
from each other. 
Normally, we live as if our home were 
neutral and the “other” were exceptional; 
this makes sense, because our home is the 
basis of our identity—our basal heart-rate, 
so to speak—and so we naturally see the 
other from this perspective. In reality, 
however, the truth is the opposite of this: 
we each become someone precisely by be-
coming “other”—by differing from the 
neutral indifference that recognizes no one. 
We become someone by establishing the 
border of intimacy that makes it possible to 
be someone ourselves and simultaneously 
makes it possible for there to be others for 
us. 
But this border is a way of making the 
world our own, an appropriation and settle-
ment within an open reality that could be 
lived otherwise. To have a home, then—to 
be someone—is something that depends 
upon the cooperation both of those with 
whom one makes a home through the inti-
mate embracing our unique importance 
and of those who are indifferent to us but 
who nonetheless respect our borders. Dis-
honesty in our experience—a dishonesty 
encouraged by the very nature of being at 
home—is not to recognize the fact that our 
home reality, our being someone, is only 
supported by the world of others, both inti-
mate and indifferent, who let it be such. 
A living organism depends on the exist-
ence of a world outside it, a world that the 
organism appropriates according to the 
needs of its own form of life. In the context 
of any life, the outside world is thus neces-
sarily both independently defined and de-
fined in terms of the organism. Something 
analogous is true of our human world. The 
world outside us—both human and natu-
ral—is something in its own right, indiffer-
ent to us. 
At the same time, there is no escaping 
our need to experience the outside world in 
terms of our own needs. What we need to 
recognize is that that the foreign world we 
experience is already defined in relation-
ship to our borders—our appropriative set-
tlement. We need both to respect the inde-
pendent autonomy of the other life-forms 
we encounter and to recognize that the 
terms in which we encounter them (and, 
likewise, the terms in which they encoun-
ter us) are already a reflection of our own 
way of establishing borders. 
In and of itself, it is not destructive to be 
a tourist, any more than it is immoral to 
date people casually. Dating is dishonest 
and destructive when the independent in-
tegrity and autonomy of the person one is 
dating is ignored, and that other is treated 
only as an object for one’s use. 
Analogously, the detached, superficial 
perspective on another culture has become 
dishonest and destructive when the foreign 
culture one encounters is treated as if it 
were only an entertaining and fascinating 
spectacle, or, worse, as if it were only an 
occasion for affirming one’s fantasy of 
moral superiority, as happens when the 
role of the U.S. in cultivating the drug-
trade with Mexico is ignored or when the 
history of Christian-European colonialism 
in shaping the contemporary reality of 
Muslim Asia is ignored. 
In these destructive relationships, the 
other is treated as if it were only how it ap-
pears to one’s home-perspective, and the 
formative role one’s own establishing of 
borders plays in shaping what is really an 
interaction of mutually independent aliens 
is ignored. 
Healthy dating, though, and likewise 
healthy cultural interaction, always holds 
within it an openness to the possibility of 
something new developing, and that means 
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the independent integrity of the other is al-
ways alive under the surface, threatening, 
so to speak, to give birth to a mutually 
transformative process that reveals to each 
that that other is in fact one’s “destiny,” 
one’s true home. 
Both personally and culturally, we need 
both to have a site of rest and security—a 
home—and to be able to venture forth from 
that home into an outside. There is no sim-
ple answer to whether approaching the 
other—personal or cultural—for a momen-
tary thrill or for an enduring reality is bet-
ter. Both approaches speak to something 
real in our desires. But only to experience 
others as exotic mysteries is a problem, as 
is only to experience the desirability of be-
ing at home. 
Any life-form is a reality that maintains 
itself in encounter with an other. The 
stronger the life-form, the stronger the 
other with which it can engage and still be 
itself. 
The strongest life-form is ultimately the 
one that, rather than defensively suppress-
ing the autonomy of the other to shore up 
its boundaries, is one for whom its borders 
are experienced precisely as the invitation 
to be changed and to come to be at home in 
what was foreign: the one that finds itself 
only in and through that other.
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In this essay, I distinguish between two 
contrasting approaches to science teach-
ing, which I name knowledge-grounded 
and understanding-grounded. In the 
knowledge-grounded approach, the stu-
dent is asked to acquire and to apply 
knowledge with little guidance on how 
to develop the necessary understanding 
to make that knowledge personally real. 
In contrast, the understanding-grounded 
approach seeks to make knowledge 
more personally vivid and meaningful 
by bringing the student to an overall un-
derstanding of the subject, within which 
relevant knowledge is situated and takes 
on a deeper, more comprehensive, first-
person significance. 
Drawing on British philosopher J.G. 
Bennett’s insights into the nature of sci-
entific activity, I illustrate how the un-
derstanding-grounded approach appeals 
to the four aspects of scientific activity 
that Bennett identifies as contact, vision, 
knowledge, and technique. For real-
world evidence, I draw on my own ex-
periences as a learner, both as a univer-
sity student and as a member of volun-
teer naturalist groups. 
I argue that, in my fruitful learning ex-
periences, teachers followed an under-
standing-grounded approach attending 
to each of these four as-
pects. In contrast, my expe-
riences of knowledge-
grounded teaching led to 
learning outcomes that were 
unsatisfactory, at least 
partly because the learning 
process did not fully incor-
porate Bennett’s four as-
pects of scientific activity. 
To provide a thematic fo-
cus, I reflect on the implica-
tions of understanding-
grounded and knowledge-
grounded approaches for sustainability 
education. I argue that the understand-
ing-grounded approach has the ad-
vantage of being more inclusive and less 
hierarchical, allowing a greater number 
of students to advance toward the 
teacher’s own state of expertise. 
 
The method of systematics 
To facilitate understanding-grounded 
learning, Bennett proposes a method that 
he names systematics, which is said to 
enable investigators to probe ever more 
deeply into the richness of a phenome-
non [1]. Systematics facilitates a pro-
gressive understanding of the phenome-
non through attention to the qualitative 
significance of number. For example, 
viewing the phenomenon as oneness or 
monad, the investigator looks for whole-
ness, which is the central qualitative 
meaning of oneness. As twoness or 
dyad, the phenomenon appears as a po-
larity or a complementarity, and as 
threeness or triad, as a relationship and 
as a process. Probing the phenomenon 
for its fourness, or tetrad, the investiga-
tor considers the phenomenon as a pat-
tern of organized activity that has some 
sort of intentional outcome. As fiveness 
or pentad, the phenomenon appears for 
the first time as an entity with a certain 
potential and reach in the world. As six-
ness or hexad, the phenomenon coa-
lesces into a recognizable event in space 
and time. 
Each of the phenomenon’s qualitative 
possibilities—monad, dyad, triad, and 
so forth—is identified by Bennett as a 
system, which can be defined by the 
given number of mutually relevant 
terms. The monad consists of a single 
term, the totality. In turn, the dyad has 
two opposing poles, or natures; the triad, 
three impulses; the tetrad, four sources; 
the pentad, five limits; and the hexad, six 
laws. Bennett describes systems up to 
twelve terms and beyond. 
As I hope to demonstrate through my 
example of science education, systemat-
ics has the advantage of bringing hith-
erto unsuspected aspects of the phenom-
enon into awareness and highlighting 
their mutual relevance. Using the sys-
tematics method, investigators consider 
the phenomenon in terms of specific sys-
tems that may draw attention to particu-
lar actions and patterns of interest. 
To study the scientific enterprise, for 
example, Bennett chooses the tetrad as 
particularly appropriate, since science 
can be readily recognized as a system of 
organized activity with definite aims 
and hopes of accomplishment. Each 
of the terms of the tetrad—the four 
sources—reveals important aspects 
of science as a directed activity aim-
ing to achieve specific outcomes.  
As a symbol, the tetrad is pictured 
by Bennett as the cross-filled dia-
mond of the figure, left. The tetrad’s 
four points are its four sources, which 
Bennett identified, on the vertical 
axis, as ground and goal; and, on the 
horizontal axis, as direction and in-
strument.  
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The tetrad of scientific ac-
tivity is illustrated in the fig-
ure, right. Note that Bennett 
identifies the two endpoints 
of the vertical axis as contact 
and vision. As ground of sci-
entific activity, contact refers 
to the scientist’s engagement 
with the material world, 
which is his or her starting 
point and presupposes an 
“accurate contact with the 
thing being studied” [2]. This 
situation of contact with the material 
world is available to the senses and 
measurable, whether directly through 
first-hand observation or through sec-
ond-hand instrumentalist means like tel-
escopes or electronic microscopes. 
In turn, vision relates to the scientist’s 
aim for a comprehensive theory provid-
ing a thorough understanding of how the 
world works. This vision of a certain 
manner of “truth” elevates science 
above the ordinary and gives it enduring 
significance and value, a pursuit that 
fuels the scientist’s passion and commit-
ment: “Significant scientific activity is 
marked by a special kind of wonder and 
faith. The scientist must have insight, vi-
sion, and a sense of nature’s mystery” 
[3].  
Next, there are the endpoints of the 
tetrad’s horizontal axis, the first of 
which is knowledge, which provides re-
search direction for the scientist and a 
“guiding intelligence” [4]. Scientific er-
udition links researchers with past and 
future efforts in the field and relates their 
ideas and findings to the larger disci-
pline of which they are a part. 
The tetrad’s other horizontal endpoint 
is technique, which refers to the practi-
cal feel scientists have for their field of 
research. Technique involves familiarity 
gained over long exposure and relates to 
the instinctive skills that researchers de-
velop for conducting effective experi-
ments and obtaining a clear account of 
phenomena. 
Bennett suggests that technique incor-
porates a field of practical action via 
which knowledge becomes actualized 
[5]. More broadly, he suggests that 
knowledge relates more to an intellec-
tual dimension of scientific endeavor, 
while technique relates more to an emo-
tional dimension [6]. He points out how 
different scientists have access to the 
four sources of scientific activity in 
unique ways. He writes: 
 
No scientist’s work is so perfectly bal-
anced that all four sources play an equal 
role. Some scientists have a knack for 
seeing empirically, while others have the 
ability to synthesize research in a field 
and to integrate their own work accord-
ingly. 
Yet again, some scientists have great 
technical skill and a determined persis-
tence to carry their work through, while 
others are visionaries who can see 
deeply into the principles of nature. Ein-
stein, for example, conducted theoretical 
experiments on paper and had little in-
terest in empirical research or practical 
techniques. He had a remarkable ability 
to integrate scientific knowledge and to 
see conceptual patterns hidden from 
other scientists [7]. 
 
Encounters with nature 
Though I grew up in England and did my 
doctoral work there, I moved to France 
in 2008. Right from the start, I was keen 
to find a community of French natural-
ists. If only there could be a way to en-
gage in practical activities to understand 
and to protect nature better. The advisor 
helping me with my adjustment to my 
new country suggested a wildlife associ-
ation affiliated with the University of 
Montpellier, itself very active in the 
ecology and conservation fields. Head-
quartered in a village not far from Mont-
pellier, this association had taken over 
an abandoned farm and had restored it as 
a wildlife preserve. 
Before making contact, I studied the 
association’s website and was inspired 
by what I read. The salaried members 
described their background, all speaking 
of their passion for the outdoors, for 
particular plants and animals, as well 
as their appreciation of the attitudes of 
fellow members, their enthusiasm and 
conviction, their humility and imagi-
nation. One wrote that he was also a 
sculptor. Another described his child-
hood memory of the soothing move-
ments of the Loire River and feeling 
like a pebble rocked back and forth on 
the riverbed. Another member pro-
claimed his conviction that there was 
no frontier between humans and na-
ture. It was gratifying to read of people 
committed to high intellectual standards 
who were also willing to speak openly of 
their feelings for the natural world. 
My first meeting with the French as-
sociation, however, came as a great 
shock. Sent out to their reclaimed farm, 
I was quickly out of my depth. We were 
handed a list of plant species covering 
fourteen A4 pages and asked to tick off 
each species as we identified examples 
in the field. The list was a great intellec-
tual achievement: an exhaustive survey 
of all plant species found on the aban-
doned farm. We were expected to con-
tribute to the effort of keeping the list 
up-to-date and to learn the particularities 
of each species. Too soon, however, this 
task became a race to tick off as many 
species as quickly as possible. 
This task could have been directed so 
differently. The more experienced mem-
bers of the association could have pro-
vided an overview of the site’s ecology 
and its plant communities and habitats. 
These senior members could have then 
directed us to a small number of key spe-
cies and given us time to study them, to 
draw them, or to take turns at describing 
them. This approach would have helped 
us to develop accurate contact with the 
plants of the place, to acquire the skills 
to study them, and to gain a feel for 
them. The list of species would have 
started to organize itself into a meaning-
ful pattern, once we started to know 
where to look for different types of plant 
and to recognize the more common spe-
cies.  
Instead, we were tasked with a cold, 
purely intellectual exercise that was a 
stark expression of the knowledge-
grounded approach, where thinking is 
paramount. Despite what association 
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members wrote on their website, feel-
ings were to play no part in their daily 
practice. For them, reliable knowledge 
of nature could only be attained by leav-
ing emotional sensibilities at the door. 
More than likely, these feelings had led 
members to that door, but once within 
the hallowed halls of science, only a pro-
fessional detachment would allow them 
to arrive at defensible conclusions. They 
were not interested in a broader under-
standing of nature to be gained by unit-
ing thinking and feeling. As my PhD su-
pervisor at the Natural History Museum 
in London told me, “You’re not here to 
understand anything!” 
The supposed neutrality of science 
can be a reassuring refuge. If knowledge 
is the only aim, then we are not to make 
value judgments but only report on what 
appears to be the case, given the balance 
of probabilities. We aim for informative 
summaries of the data we have so pains-
takingly gathered. We conduct the anal-
yses and produce the graphs that our 
chosen domain requires. We publish and 
go on to collect and analyze more data. 
In the face of the climate crisis and the 
decline of biodiversity, we can make a 
very good career documenting the crisis 
as it unfolds. 
Reducing science to the accumula-
tion of knowledge relieves scientists of 
the burden to act. The Guardian ran an 
article that struck an encouraging con-
trast. It described an attempt to renew 
seagrass meadows along the United 
Kingdom’s coast and thereby to help re-
duce greenhouse gases, improve water 
quality, and provide valuable nurseries 
for commercial fish species. I was struck 
by the refreshing candor of one of the 
scientists behind the initiative, Richard 
Unsworth of Swansea University, for 
whom knowledge is a tool in the service 
of an overarching vision, namely the 
mutual flourishing of humans and na-
ture. He wrote: 
 
As a scientist, and as a father, I could 
spend the next 20 years writing awesome 
academic papers about seagrass decline 
or spend the 20 years doing something 
about it. We have a responsibility as sci-




Telling details leaping out 
In my final year studying natural sci-
ences at university, I took a course in 
vertebrate morphology and evolution. 
The course involved practical sessions 
where we studied fossils in the univer-
sity museum’s collections. I always re-
member the museum director teaching 
us how to look at a fossil of an acantho-
dian, a kind of early fish. He asked us 
simple questions such as “Where is the 
front?” or “Where is the top?” Before his 
simple questions, I could not make out 
anything in the fossil. I made a guess at 
where the fish’s nose was and where the 
line of its back was traced out in the 
rock. Suddenly, telling details leapt out 
at me from the rock. I could now see the 
body outline and make out the fins, with 
a strong spine in front of each, the dis-
tinctive characteristic of the acanthodi-
ans. 
I had a contrasting experience when I 
asked a young postdoctoral researcher 
for help. I was struggling to identify the 
bones of a fossil fish’s shoulder girdle. 
He asked me no questions. In a matter of 
seconds, he produced a sketch of the fos-
sil annotated with the names of all the 
bones. I saw that I had been confused be-
cause the cleithrum, a major component 
of the shoulder girdle, had in fact broken 
into many pieces during fossilization. 
On one hand, I was bewildered by how 
this researcher had worked that out. On 
the other hand, he complained about my 
asking him to carry out such a “labelling 
exercise” because this was not his role. I 
was none the wiser, however, as to how 
I could have come to the same conclu-
sions as he.  
In great contrast, the museum director 
guided us to ask simple questions about 
the fossil in front of us. We were able to 
help ourselves to understand the fossil 
better and make discoveries without de-
tailed guidance. We were given time to 
get used to “reading” the fossils and to 
make accurate contact with them. He 
helped us develop our technique and 
skill. I remember his congratulating us at 
the end of the term, at the range of ver-
tebrate diversity that we could now com-
prehend. He reminded us that this 
achievement would have been unthinka-
ble when the course began. 
For the brilliant postdoctoral re-
searcher, the bones were just there in the 
fossil I showed him, but he was unable 
to guide me toward the same under-
standing because he made no place for 
showing and discussing—no place for 
dialogue. As a student, I needed to be 
quick, to need no time to digest, reflect 
or ponder to be able to grasp what he was 
presenting. There was no process, no 
gaining familiarity, no tricks for getting 
one’s eye in, and no clues for under-
standing the peculiarities of this group of 
fishes. 
This expert conveyed to me his 
knowledge, but I was left to my igno-
rance. I had a similar experience with 
another French wildlife association. The 
founder was a professional ecologist. He 
was helped by a retired engineer who 
had made his living at the paper factory 
in Beaucaire but had a keen interest in 
birds. On a field trip to look for birds of 
prey, I remember how the professional 
ecologist, while describing a particular 
species, commented that there were two 
nesting pairs in the neighboring valley. 
“How did that help us,” I wondered? On 
another occasion, two birds passed us 
with a dipping flight. “They’re pipits,” 
he said, without explanation. Both times, 
he made an impressive, self-centered 
display of his knowledge that was not at 
all helpful to us learners! 
In contrast, the retired engineer would 
take us aside and give us simple lessons. 
He taught us to recognize the song of the 
nightingale (Luscinia megarhynchos) 
[9]. I remember how he began to whistle 
the bird’s song for us, and a nightingale 
responded in kind from the reeds! We 
would take turns looking through the 
binoculars at a distant group of birds, 
and he would point out the species that 
we could see. In this way, he helped my 
wife see her first swamphen (Porphyrio 
porphyrio) on a visit to the Camargue 
marshes [10]. In all, he accompanied us 
in our learning and helped us to grow in 
confidence and understanding.  
 
You must remain critical! 
I remember a discussion I had with the 
postdoctoral researcher in the university 
museum. He told me how a consensus 
was emerging for the existence of a pre-
viously unrecognized group of fossil 
fishes. I was excited. This was in keep-
ing with my vision of what science was 
all about: patterns of order emerging 
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where before there was only chaos and 
confusion. 
Seeing my excitement, the postdoc-
toral researcher chided me, saying that 
the jury was still out, and we had to re-
main critical. I was expressing my vi-
sion, but he responded as if I were pre-
tending to knowledge. For him, 
knowledge must be tested and evaluated 
critically in view of the evidence. My vi-
sion, on the other hand, was an intui-
tion—of order in nature—that inspired 
me in my pursuit of science. The goal 
and ideal of science—vision in Ben-
nett’s tetradic sense—cannot be reduced 
to a state of knowledge. 
One must also realize that contact with 
the material realm being studied may be 
distorted by the lens of knowledge in 
that cerebral abstractions can interfere 
with direct engagement with nature. 
Whereas the role of accurate knowledge 
in science is easily made explicit, scien-
tists may remain entirely unaware of the 
roles of contact, technique, and vision. 
Bennett points out how Rutherford 
and Faraday had an uncanny contact 
with nature and a sense of how to con-
ceive and carry out experiments that 
would allow phenomena to reveal them-
selves [11]. With regard to technique, 
chemist and philosopher of science Mi-
chael Polanyi emphasized that practical 
mastery is often passed on by example, 
through apprenticeship. He also high-
lighted the role of vision in science—the 
scientist’s intuition of a fruitful problem 
to study or of a possible solution even if 
dimly glimpsed. Polanyi explained how 
these “hunches” fuel the scientist’s com-
mitment to his subject [12]. 
The young postdoctoral researcher 
had spent years in contact with fossils, 
studying them, gaining a feel for their 
different peculiarities and developing a 
knack for recognizing bone patterns. To 
strengthen his technique, he worked pa-
tiently through repeated exposure to the 
source material. He read widely and de-
veloped a thorough knowledge of the 
field, not only the anatomy of the differ-
ent animal groups but also of the process 
of fossilization. He clearly had a vision 
of science as the movement toward an 
ever more accurate picture of nature. 
In his own practice, this researcher 
drew on all the tetrad’s sources, cultivat-
ing a healthy balance among contact, 
knowledge, technique, and vision. One 
recognized this balance in the depth of 
his understanding and expertise. In his 
teaching, however, he evaluated my per-
formance with regard only to the 
knowledge I displayed. 
It is perhaps significant that this judg-
ment was accompanied by an aggres-
sive, competitive tone of voice, as if to 
say: “You should know by now what 
you’re looking at. You should know this 
group of animals. I’m not here to do the 
work for you.” His attitude was cold and 
demanding, in contrast to the warmth 
and patience of the museum director. 
This researcher gave me no time for pro-
longed contact nor time to develop my 
skills in looking, drawing and interpret-
ing. He projected no inspiring vision to 
motivate me. 
If the scientist follows the knowledge-
grounded approach in his teaching, it be-
comes the student’s responsibility to de-
velop strategies to acquire understand-
ing. There will be some students who 
have gained the required knowledge out-
side the lesson who will be able to com-
plete the exercise without the teacher’s 
assistance. There will be other students 
who have sufficiently developed their 
contact, technique and vision to quickly 
grasp what is required. These students 
will be able to carry out the learning task 
asking only a few pertinent questions. 
Yet again, there will be students who 
need to draw on all four sources to un-
derstand the lesson. Since these are not 
given explicit attention in a knowledge-
grounded approach, these students will 
find it difficult to understand and to 
complete the learning task. 
Following an understanding-
grounded approach in one’s teaching is 
more inclusive. This approach to learn-
ing levels the playing field, offering the 
opportunity for most students to pro-
gress. As clarified by the four terms of 
Bennett’s tetrad, understanding-
grounded learning highlights the role of 
craft in science and the journey to exper-
tise, thus diminishing the distance be-
tween student and teacher. 
In my experience, knowledge-
grounded teaching is at times reduced to 
nothing more than testing, checking who 
already has the resources to complete the 
task. Rather than taking students from 
where they are and helping them to 
move forward in their apprenticeship, 
the teacher reminds them of what they 
don’t know. The teacher holds on to his 
or her position of power and projects an 
air of mystique. 
 
Learning and understanding 
Understanding-grounded teaching is ul-
timately more successful and more valu-
able than knowing-grounded teaching 
because there is a direct, empathetic en-
gagement with nature that resonates 
with the “wholeness” of human beings. 
As educator Stuart Hill insists: “It is im-
portant to ask: in what ways can educa-
tion help us get out of the many messes 
we are in? Most current education will 
not significantly help us. In fact, it will 
result in a perpetuation of the mess, and 
most likely add to it” [13]. What styles 
of teaching offer a way out of this 
“mess” toward a just, sustainable coex-
istence of humans with each other and 
with nature?  
In emphasizing the dominance of in-
tellect and cerebral effort, the 
knowledge-grounded approach leads to 
a style of teaching that is top-down, hi-
erarchical, competitive, and adversarial. 
In contrast, the understanding-grounded 
approach acknowledges the integral im-
portance of contact, knowledge, tech-
nique, and vision. One can hold these 
four sources in mind as they each play a 
pivotal role in one’s research and teach-
ing. In this emphasis on understanding, 
science can involve the whole person, 
drawing on sensing, perceiving, think-
ing, feeling and intuiting. 
Cultivating a student’s understanding 
requires a style of teaching that is bot-
tom-up, egalitarian, and collaborative. 
Knowledge assures that one’s engage-
ment with nature is well informed con-
ceptually. But understanding is only 
possible when knowledge is integrated 
with technique. Only in this way does 
contact with nature ascend toward the 
much broader aim of comprehensive 
theory attuned to nature’s diversity and 
unity.  
For Hill, the choice of the best style of 
teaching is “profoundly simple.” He 
writes: 
 
[E]ducators can be most effective by en-
abling learners to clarify what they want 
to learn, and in supporting them in their 
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unique learning journeys. This may in-
volve empathetic, active listening, 
providing respectful, constructive feed-
back, appropriate challenging, facilitat-
ing access to relevant information and 
resources, mentoring, modelling and 
sharing (particularly of enabling stories 
from one’s own and other’s experiences, 
including from throughout history), ac-
knowledging and celebrating efforts and 
achievements… Yes, if we approached 
education in this way humans might ac-
tually be enabled to become much more 




1. For an introduction, see J.G. Bennett, 
Elementary Systematics. Bennett Books: 
Santa Fe, NM, 1993. 
2. For an account of the four sources, see 
Bennett, Elementary Systematics, ch. 4 
and pp. 67–69, which include an account 
of scientific activity. The tetrad’s four 
sources as ground, direction, instrument, 
and goal are presented in J.G. Bennett, 
The Dramatic Universe, Vol. 3: Man 
and his Nature, p. 32.  
3. Elementary Systematics, p. 68. 
4. J.G. Bennett, The Dramatic Universe 
Vol. 3, §14.37.7, definition of “direc-
tion.” 
5. Dramatic Universe Vol. 3, §14.37.7, 
definition of “instrument.” p. 7. 
6. Bennett 1993, p. 68. 




gency-fight, accessed April 12, 2020. 
9. https://www.oiseaux.net/oiseaux/ros-




sultane.html, accessed April 12, 2020. 
11. Bennett, Elementary Systematics, p. 
67. 
12. M. Polanyi (1958). Personal 
Knowledge. Univ. of Chicago Press. 
13. S.B. Hill (2012). Education to 
Change the World, p. 1, 
http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1435.73
68; adapted from a radio broadcast, ac-
cessed April 17, 2020.  
14. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
  
19





Seeing and Understanding Holistically 
Goethean Science and the Wholeness of Nature 
Henri Bortoft 
 
Bortoft (1938–2012) was a philosopher, physicist, and science educator who wrote Taking Appearance Seriously (2012) and the 
influential Wholeness of Nature (1996). This essay was originally a paper for the conference, “Goethean Science in Holistic Per-
spective: Scientific, Ethical, and Educational Implications,” held at Columbia University’s Teacher College, New York City, May 
20–22, 1999. The essay is published with the permission of Jacqueline Bortoft. Note that, in the original written version of his talk, 
Bortoft does not provide complete references. Here, we have added citations as available, but some works remain unreferenced. 
The editor thanks Stephen Wood for assistance in locating references. 
    This essay was originally published in four parts in the summer/fall 2018, winter/spring 2019, summer/fall 2019, and win-
ter/spring 2020 issues of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology. Several readers have requested that we republish the 
four parts as one complete essay, and we provide that request here. See EAP, spring, 2013, for the “in memoriam” issue devoted to 
Bortoft, including his essay, “The Transformative Potential of Paradox.” © 2020 Jacqueline Bortoft. 
 
he central question I ask is what 
contribution Goethean science 
makes to understanding the 
wholeness of nature. I contend 
that there is something to be known about 
the wholeness of nature to which Goethean 
science can contribute. I was first intro-
duced to the problem of wholeness by 
physicist David Bohm (1917–1992), when 
I became one of his post-graduate research 
students in the early 1960s (Bohm 1980, 
2003; Bortoft 1982). Today, Bohm’s name 
is associated with wholeness and quantum 
physics but, in fact, this topic was first rec-
ognized and explored by physicist Niels 
Bohr (1885–1962), who saw that a new 
factor in physics—what he called “an indi-
visible wholeness” and completely absent 
in classical physics—arose because of the 
indivisibility of the quantum itself. 
Bohr was particularly concerned about 
the consequences of this indivisibility for 
measurement, a problem that led him to 
speak of the “unanalyzable wholeness” of 
the measuring apparatus and the phenome-
non being measured. Faced with this con-
cern, Bohr adopted a somewhat pessimistic 
view: Although physicists might be able to 
speak of the bare concept, “wholeness,” 
this was all they could say. Thus, there was 
no possibility of identifying a more ade-
quate, content-filled concept of wholeness 
than its “unanalyzability.” 
Bohr proposed that wholeness is an irra-
tionality in nature just as the square root of 
the number two is an irrationality in math-
ematics. And just as the incommensurabil-
ity of the length of the diagonal of a trian-
gle with unit sides is accommodated by the 
extension of the system of integers and 
fractions to “cover” cases that do not fit 
into that number system, so Bohr believed 
it possible to accommodate the “irrational” 
wholeness in quantum physics by an anal-
ogous procedure of using the concepts of 
classical physics (the only physics he 
thought there could be) in a way that would 
“cover” wholeness, even though whole-
ness as such does not fit into that concep-
tual system. 
Here, we reach Bohm’s disagreement 
with Bohr: Bohm believed it was possible 
to have a content-filled idea of wholeness. 
The huge problem was how to do it? 
 
Irreducible quantum wholeness 
The irreducible wholeness in quantum 
physics is seen dramatically in the case of 
interference experiments with a single-
photon light source. There arises the diffi-
culty of thinking of the single photon as 
having a definite path as would be the case 
if the photon were a classical particle. If we 
insist that the photon is a classical particle, 
then we find ourselves in the contradictory 
position of saying that the single photon 
travels simultaneously in both one path and 
two paths. How at the same time can some-
thing that seems one also seem two? Here, 
with a vengeance, we have the irreducible 
wholeness of quantum indivisibility. As 
physicist Arthur Zajonc (1995, p. 299) ex-
plained, 
 
Goethe was right [when he said about 
light, “How often do they strive to divide 
that which, despite everything, would al-
ways remain single and whole?”]. Try 
though we may to split light into fundamen-
tal atomic pieces, it remains whole to the 
end. Our very notion of what it means to be 
elementary is challenged. Until now we 
have equated smallest with most funda-
mental. Perhaps for light, at least, the most 
fundamental feature is not found in small-
ness but rather in wholeness. 
 
Completely absent from the world of 
classical physics, the irreducible “quantum 
wholeness” became even more evident in 
the discussions between Einstein and Bohr 
that eventually led to the formulation of the 
paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 
(EPR) and its later reformulation in Bell’s 
inequality theory (which has now received 
remarkable experimental confirmation; see 
Zajonc 1995). This research made evident 
that quantum wholeness cannot be de-
scribed in terms of independent elements 
externally connected. 
Quantum “non-locality” (as it is called) 
seems to involve “two” objects that are far 
apart physically and yet can be connected 
instantaneously as if they are not separated 
at all. Again, we have a situation where the 
language used contradicts what one is try-
ing to say—i.e., we are trying to describe 
quantum non-locality in the language of 
physical locality. 
In the quantum domain, reality cannot be 
broken down into independent parts and 
hence cannot be analyzed (if we mean by 
that word “broken apart and measured”). 
At this fundamental level of presence, the 
world cannot be thought of as composed of 
T 
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independent parts connected together in 
some way. 
We do, however, continue to think in 
terms of parts and whole, largely because 
the very form of our language channels our 
doing so. Bohm pointed to the fact that the 
subject-verb structure assumed by modern 
languages tends to emphasize the role of 
separate entities acting on other entities, in-
teracting by connections external to those 
entities themselves. He stressed how nouns 
are the dominant form, whereas earlier lan-
guages were often verb-based and there-
fore did not encourage speakers to think 
primarily in terms of separate, localized 
entities. 
Niels Bohr himself was acutely aware of 
the crucial role that language plays in hu-
man understanding. In fact, it was a major 
source of his epistemological pessimism 
regarding quantum theory. As he ex-
plained, “We are suspended in language in 
such a way that we cannot say what is up 
and what is down” (Petersen 1985, p. 302). 
Since Bohr assumed we cannot escape 
from this situation, he thought that the only 
way we could describe the quantum world 
was via concepts already available to us—
i.e., the concepts of classical physics. 
Hence, we had to learn how to use these 
concepts in such a way as to accommodate 
“irrational” quantum wholeness without 
leading our understanding into contradic-
tion. He mounted a heroic rearguard de-
fense for a situation that he perceived as 
impossible. 
 
Seeing wholeness directly 
Bohm thought differently and brought at-
tention to the relationship between forms 
of language and ways we perceive and 
think about the world. It was studying this 
relationship that partly led to my working 
with British philosopher J.G. Bennett 
(1897–1974) on the problem of language 
and the perception of wholeness. Bennett 
was particularly interested in time, believ-
ing that our ordinary language led us into 
wrong ways of thinking about temporal 
processes (Bennett 1956–1966). In my 
work with him, he proposed an experiment 
in which we adopted an artificial language 
that modified the way we describe simple 
actions and events (Bennett, Bortoft, and 
Pledge 1965). 
The aim was to see how this different 
language might modify our perceptions. A 
key feature of the experiment was to avoid 
introducing what Bennett called “descrip-
tive fictions”—i.e., factors introduced into 
descriptions that could not be found in ex-
perience. These factors often took the form 
of connecting linkages added to what was 
given directly in experience—for example, 
hypothetical entities functioning as hidden 
causal mechanisms. Whereas what was 
connected entered directly into experience, 
these connections themselves did not be-
cause they were postulated speculatively. 
The discipline required to describe ac-
tions and events, excluding all interpretive 
fictions and yet giving a thorough descrip-
tion, seemed to focus our thinking in a 
new, unfamiliar way (as well as evoking 
states of extreme irritation and exaspera-
tion). We began to experience “break-
throughs” into a new kind of perception. 
There was a transformation in the mode of 
togetherness of the elements. At first, we 
saw these elements only as separated from 
each other but, over time, we realized they 
were connected directly. In other words, 
they were connected at the start and, there-
fore, there was no need to propose some 
extra “connection” added on after the fact. 
In seeing this mode of togetherness in 
this transformative way, we realized that 
one can see wholeness directly, where 
“seeing” means phenomenological seeing 
and not the empiricist’s reduction of seeing 
to just sense perception [1]. Although the 
context was different, we felt we had be-
gun to learn how to do what Bohr had de-
clared impossible: to see wholeness di-
rectly as it is in itself (Bortoft 1971). 
 
Both separation and wholeness 
Because nothing extra is added, this expe-
rience of transformation in the mode of to-
getherness can be described as a situation 
where “nothing has changed, but every-
thing is different.” When we see that the 
connections are intrinsic rather than extrin-
sic, separation does not suddenly disap-
pear. Rather, we have both together: both 
separation and wholeness. The experience 
is twofold but not dual. 
One can make a parallel with reading. 
Consider the three letters “c,” “a,” and “t” 
as they appear in the word “cat.” Perceptu-
ally, the letters appear as separate, and we 
might attempt to overcome this separation 
by introducing external linkages as with 
“c-a-t.” This device, however, eclipses the 
possibility of reading. When we recognize 
the meaning “cat,” the letters remain sepa-
rate but are also connected in a subtler way 
than linking them together by introducing 
an external connection of hyphens. This 
experience of seeing the meaning in com-
plete words (rather than as separated but 
connected letters) parallels the experience 
of seeing wholeness directly. 
Although I didn’t know at the time, this 
way of seeing is in tune with Wittgen-
stein’s “new way of thinking.” What I also 
didn’t realize was that the transformation 
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy marking his 
later extraordinarily creative period was 
brought about by his encounter with the 
work of Goethe [2]. Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy is concerned with “the under-
standing that consists in seeing connec-
tions,” which for him was a kind of seeing 
that did not need explanation because con-
nections are encountered directly. This di-
rect seeing of connections was crucial for 
Wittgenstein because he saw this kind of 
seeing as understanding so that seeing and 
understanding are one, and there is no need 
for explanation because it is replaced by 
seeing. Wittgenstein emphasized that to 
connect two things, we do not need a third 
because things connect directly—i.e., they 
already stand in connection with one an-
other, and therefore there is no need to in-




My first encounter with Goethe came later 
and happened, by a stroke of good fortune, 
when a friend mentioned a book he thought 
I might find interesting—philosopher 
Ernst Lehrs’ Man or Matter (Lehrs 1958), 
an introduction to Goethe’s way of science. 
In reading the book’s fifth chapter, “The 
Adventure of Reason,” I suddenly found 
myself feeling completely at home. The 
limitation that Kant put on the human cog-
nitive capacity to know wholes—“Above 
all, it is not given to such a thinking to 
think ‘wholes’ in such a way that through 
an act of thought alone the single items 
contained in them can be conceived as 
parts springing from them by necessity” 
(Lehrs 1958, p. 82)—reminded me of 
Bohr’s strictures on our ability to under-
stand quantum wholeness [4]. But here was 
Goethe declaring that he had done in prac-
tice the very thing that Kant declared im-
possible in principle for the human mind to 
know [5]. 
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In his conversation with Schiller, Goethe 
had said that “there must certainly be an-
other way altogether [rather than a piece-
meal way] that did not treat of nature as di-
vided in pieces, but presented her as work-
ing and alive, striving out of the whole into 
the parts” (Lehrs 1958, p. 104). Goethe’s 
work on the metamorphosis of plants illus-
trated this movement from the whole into 
the parts, rather than aiming to move from 
the parts to the whole, in the way it showed 
all the different organs up to the stem as 
metamorphoses of one and the same plant 
organ (Goethe 1790/2009). 
As I read Lehrs, it seemed evident to me 
that Goethe could see the wholeness in na-
ture directly and, more so, had developed a 
set of specific practices that could lead to 
this holistic way of seeing. In fact, one of 
these methods—exakte sinnliche phantai-
sie, or “exact sensorial imagination”—was 
familiar to me already from working with 
Bennett. We had found that the practice of 
what we called “visualization” to be ex-
tremely valuable for using the mind in a 
way allowing us to disengage from the ha-
bitual activity of mental associations, a 
dominant characteristic of the ordinary, 
discursive mind [6]. 
Besides Goethe’s plant studies, there 
was also his work on color (Goethe 
1810/1970). Here, his insistence on staying 
with the phenomenon and refusing to go 
“behind” it by the artifice of introducing 
hypothetical concepts or models seemed to 
be the aim of my work with Bennett, albeit 
our results were far inferior to Goethe’s ef-
forts, which had produced what amounted 
to an entirely new way of doing science 
(Bortoft 1996; Seamon and Zajonc 1998). 
I also immediately made a connection 
between Goethe’s work and quantum 
physics in that Goethe’s method pointed to 
the renouncement not only of classical 
models in physics but of all models as 
such. This is the positive side of Bohr’s un-
derstanding: by insisting that all models be 
renounced, he thereby returned physics to 
being truly phenomenological—in other 
words, returning to the original phenomena 
from which physics as a science arose. 
 
Finding phenomenology 
Clearly, there was much to learn from Goe-
the, and I began to explore his work in de-
tail (Bortoft 1985, 1986, 1996, 2012, 
2013). At about the same time as I began 
this task, Bohm distributed draft versions 
of his two papers on the implicate order, in 
which he took the hologram as a metaphor 
for the kind of wholeness that he saw as a 
fundamental new order in physics (Bohm 
1980, chaps. 6 and 7). As with Goethe, 
here was another instance of going from 
the whole to the part. I realized that it 
should be possible to use this way of un-
derstanding to show how the radically new 
direction taken by Goethe was a reversal of 
our habitual way of thinking. At the same 
time, one could use Goethe’s approach to 
illuminate Bohm’s notion of an intrinsi-
cally implicate order. I was never able, 
however, to interest Bohm in the connec-
tion with Goethe, perhaps because he was 
not willing to see past scientists’ and phi-
losophers’ typical stereotypical under-
standing of Goethe’s science. 
Also at this time, I discovered phenome-
nology, which came as a revelation—an 
experience of stepping into a different di-
mension of mind, but one that is there in 
front of us all the while, only hidden from 
our customary assumptions. The funda-
mental insight of Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy is that we see the necessary structure 
of experience—the intrinsic necessity—
and not just the discrete particulars of ex-
perience that empiricism assumes. Percep-
tion is twofold: simultaneously, an aware-
ness of contingent particulars (just the facts 
as such) and perception of necessary struc-
tures, connections, and relations among the 
facts (the idea as such). Empiricism does 
not recognize this complementarity, col-
lapsing the two into one, which it identifies 
with sense experience only. The result is 
endless confusion—e.g., the notion that 
experience itself is incomplete and re-
quires something added by “the mind.” 
The key point is that we see directly the 
way in which the particulars are neces-
sarily connected. We do not infer the nec-
essary connection by means of intellectual 
speculation after seeing. We see the neces-
sary structure directly because to know is 
to see—this is Husserl’s fundamental in-
sight and is not a metaphor. While we may 
say that seeing the necessary structure in 
the facts is analogous to the sensory seeing 
of the facts, it would be better to turn the 
phrasing around and say that sensory see-
ing is a particular species of seeing (instead 
of being the only real case of seeing, as is 
conventionally assumed). 
It is the recognition of this integral to-
getherness of seeing and knowing that 
prompted Goethe’s reply to Schiller, who 
had said, “That is no experience. That is an 
idea.” But Goethe responded, “I am glad to 
have ideas without knowing it, and to see 
them with my very eyes.” 
Looking back via Husserl, we recognize 
that Goethe’s statement was an attempt to 
express the insight that only came later 
with phenomenology—namely, that we 
can and do see ideas directly, but that lack-
ing an adequate basis for being able to say 
this, Goethe made the mistake of attrib-
uting this seeing to sense perception. There 
is both a positive and negative here: nega-
tive, in that Goethe was mistaken about 
knowing being a matter of sense percep-
tion; positive, in that he recognized a way 
of knowing that is seeing. 
In one sense, Goethe was a phenomenol-
ogist, and phenomenology is a crucial way 
of understanding his work, since it has al-
ways been too easy to mistake his efforts 
as naïve empiricism, which is not the case 
at all. It is his phenomenological way of 
seeing that is exemplified to some degree 
by his science of color and his work on the 
morphology of plants. One finds more re-
cent examples in the work of zoologist 
Wolfgang Schad (2019) on the morphol-
ogy of mammals; and the work of biologist 
Craig Holdrege (1998) on seeing animals 
whole. There is also the work of ecologist 
Mark Riegner (1993, 1998), who examines 
the wholeness of landscapes as revealed 
through their flora and fauna. 
 
Husserl and Wittgenstein 
As my work proceeded, the discovery of an 
unsuspected affinity between Husserl’s 
phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy was particularly astonishing, 
since many commentators claimed that the 
two thinkers were philosophical antipodes. 
What we realize today, however, is that 
both Husserl and Wittgenstein, in different 
ways, were working toward the same 
recognition: that there is a direct kind of 
seeing that understands without explain-
ing—without the need to explain—be-
cause this way of understanding is seeing. 
For Husserl, to know is to see; this aim 
takes the form of seeing the necessary, in-
trinsic structures of the phenomenon. For 
Wittgenstein, there is a way of seeing that 
is also a way of understanding, which takes 
the form of seeing connections—the inten-
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sive interlinkages wherein things are to-
gether directly because they “already stand 
in connection with one another.” 
In this sense, the differences between 
Husserl and Wittgenstein are far less sig-
nificant than their common ground: an ex-
perience of direct seeing likened meta-
phorically to another dimension of the phe-
nomenon itself. In other words, what at the 
start is seen as only “two-dimensional” is 
suddenly seen as “three-dimensional” [7].  
 
Affinities 
But only with the publication of Ray 
Monk’s Wittgenstein biography in 1990 
(Monk 1990), did I first learn of the crucial 
influence that Goethe had on Wittgen-
stein’s emphasis on “the understanding 
that consists of connections.” Monk claims 
that this emphasis on seeing connections 
has no precedent in the Western philosoph-
ical tradition “unless one finds a place for 
Goethe… in that tradition” (Monk 1990, p. 
316). In this sense, one might describe the 
Goethean way of seeing the wholeness of 
nature in the manner of either Husserl or 
Wittgenstein. For example, in his percep-
tive study of the horned mammals, Schad 
makes visible what he calls “the awesome 
inner logic of the organism” (Schad 1977, 
p. 118), which could just as easily be inter-
preted as seeing the necessary structure or 
principle (Husserl) or seeing the “gram-
mar” of intensive connections (Wittgen-
stein). 
Reflecting on the beginnings of my own 
interest in the question of wholeness, I re-
alize that the work done by a small group 
of us with Bennett in the 1960s was unwit-
tingly an initiation into a wider movement 
in modern consciousness. Our stumbling 
attempts to learn how to see wholeness di-
rectly in things, prepared a doorway for us 
to enter into a much more comprehensive 
cultural stream than any of us could have 
realized at the time. The pathway I have 
taken since then reveals certain unexpected 
affinities: 
 
▪ Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by 
Husserl’s phenomenology, which 
among other things, shows us the differ-
ence between Goethe’s science and the 
phenomenalism for which superficially 
it can be mistaken; 
▪ Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was in-
spired directly by his encounter with 
Goethe’s way of seeing; consequently, 
Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by 
Wittgenstein, just as Wittgenstein’s 
“new way of thinking” is illuminated by 
Goethean science; 
▪ Husserl and Wittgenstein were, each in 
his own way, really concerned with the 
same kind of seeing; thus, unexpectedly, 
one realizes an affinity between two 
thinkers long thought to be different in 
their ways of understanding. 
 
Toward a science of wholeness 
As I hope the above discussion indicates, I 
am interested primarily in seeing and un-
derstanding wholeness, which necessarily 
requires a phenomenological science. My 
concern with Goethean science is the ex-
tent to which it contributes to this science 
of wholeness. In locating Goethe’s contri-
bution to this effort, I begin by considering 
his work in the context of the historical de-
velopment of modern science—a task that 
Goethe himself found of considerable in-
terest. 
In spite of our shifting understanding of 
the nature of science, the “myth” of empir-
icism continues today to dominate science 
education and popular understanding. This 
perspective assumes that scientific 
knowledge is based directly on the experi-
ence of the senses. Empirical observations 
and experiments are the grounds upon 
which scientific knowledge is built. In this 
view, modern science began when human 
beings “came to their senses” and no 
longer relied on religious or philosophical 
speculation. 
The history of science, however, does 
not support this view. In fact, when we 
look at the major scientific developments 
from Copernicus to Newton, we find that 
what actually unfolded was the opposite: 
people “took leave of their senses” in favor 
of the mathematical. From the beginning, 
modern science elevated the mathematical 
above all other aspects of nature. Renais-
sance scientists like Galileo contended that 
the experience of the senses was an illusion 
and that reality was to be discovered accu-
rately only by going behind experiential 
appearances to discover mathematical rela-
tionships, ratios, and harmonies not visible 
to the senses directly.  
But why should the mathematical be el-
evated above all other factors with the con-
sequent demotion to secondary status of all 
non-mathematical aspects of a phenome-
non? There was nothing like this demotion 
in medieval science, where mathematical 
certainty had its place but was not given 
the privileged status of the way to truth. 
Furthermore, there was no objective basis 
for this demotion in that no one suddenly 
“discovered” that reality is only mathemat-
ical. 
In fact, this emphasis on the mathemati-
cal had no “scientific” basis. It was not dis-
covered by science but incorporated into 
science. Grounded in the cultural-histori-
cal ethos of the time, this mathematical 
emphasis points to a free-standing decision 
to do science in this way. “Free-standing” 
is the crux here, since there is nothing in-
herent in nature that requires consideration 
only in terms of its mathematical aspects. 
There is no intrinsic scientific basis for this 
mathematical choice. Rather, this choice 
works as a precept: this is how science will 
be done and specifies what counts as “sci-
entific.” The result is a new organizing 
idea that transforms science itself. 
 
The historicity of science 
The rejection of the senses and the affirma-
tion of mathematics as the source of truth 
arose from the way in which Platonic phi-
losophy was interpreted in the Renaissance 
(together with the role of the Sun as repre-
sentative of God in the visible world and 
therefore the center of that world). 
This shift in understanding relates to 
what historians of science now refer to as 
the intrinsic historicity of science: that cul-
tural-historical context enters into the very 
form that scientific knowledge takes. This 
recognition of an intrinsic historical di-
mension means that science is not, as is of-
ten assumed, a self-founding and self-gen-
erating activity with absolute foundations. 
Nor does this contextual recognition mean 
that scientific knowledge is somehow arbi-
trary or relative in a subjective sense. What 
it does mean is that nature is portrayed in 
its mathematical aspect because that aspect 
is an integral part of what nature is. But this 
way of understanding does not preclude 
that there are other ways in which nature 
can manifest and thus be. 
Once, however, scientists embark on a 
research program emphasizing mathemati-
cal knowledge, the possibility of under-
standing nature in other ways is mostly set 
aside. At least at first, there was no sugges-
tion that sensory qualities were not real as-
pects of the world, even if they were not 
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considered to be as fundamental as na-
ture’s mathematical dimension. 
Over time, however, sensory qualities 
were denied any “objective” reality in 
themselves and, instead, were taken to be 
entirely subjective. Galileo seems to have 
first introduced this ontological bifurcation 
into physics, and this point of view was 
subsequently adopted by others, most no-
tably Descartes. The result was that any-
thing in nature not mathematical (i.e., iden-
tifiable via quantity) was assumed to be 
“subjective” and thereby excluded. The 
eventual result was the impoverishment of 
nature [8]. 
 
Incorporating secondary qualities 
Goethe recognized that this elevation of 
the mathematical above other qualities of 
nature was unwarranted in that the empha-
sis had no intrinsic validity. He did not 
seek to devalue the mathematical approach 
but to restore the distinction between the 
sciences and mathematics in situations 
where this distinction had become con-
fused, thus distorting a fuller understand-
ing of nature [9]. 
His major aim was to renew the signifi-
cance of the so-called “secondary” quali-
ties of the natural world. In his light stud-
ies, for example, he took color as a phe-
nomenon in its own right and, by giving at-
tention to the phenomenality of color, he 
sought to discover the laws of color phe-
nomenologically. He hoped to locate the 
necessary connections that constitute the 
“inner logic” of the qualities of color (such 
“laws” being the equivalent in a phenome-
nological science of the quality of color to 
the mathematical laws in the quantitative 
science of light). 
The irony is that, in returning directly to 
the phenomenon via firsthand, sensuous 
experience, Goethe was doing what many 
people assume science does anyway but 
which in fact is not done in its mathemati-
cal version. 
 
A dynamic way of seeing 
Goethe’s method for a science of color can 
be specified in one word: attention. He 
gives attention to the phenomenon in ques-
tion and thereby strives to guard against the 
introduction of any theoretical factors out-
side the phenomenon. Such external fac-
tors could only have the effect of obscuring 
the necessary connections within the phe-
nomenon itself and substituting for the per-
ception of necessity in the phenomenon 
what is no more than an external explana-
tion—“external,” that is, as compared to 
the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon it-
self [10]. 
Goethe directed attention to the phenom-
enon in two stages. First, he attempted an 
active seeing, a way of encountering the 
phenomenon considerably different from a 
taken-for-granted registering of sense im-
pressions. In active seeing, one works to 
reverse the direction of seeing so as to go 
from the observer into the observed (rather 
than from the observed to the observer, 
which is the habitual way in which one 
looks and sees). 
This effort of active seeing is followed 
by what Goethe called exact sensorial im-
agination, in which one attempts, without 
looking, to re-envision the original en-
counter. The effort is an imaginative but 
accurate consciousness of the phenomenon 
[11]. Unlike any fanciful imagination that 
embroiders the phenomenon and envisions 
it as something more or less than it is, the 
aim of exact sensorial imagination is to be 
as true as possible to the perceived phe-
nomenon. But this is not a static activity as 
if the aim were just to achieve an “inner” 
picturing of the phenomenon. Because we 
attempt to make the imaginative seeing 
happen in a way that we do not need to do 
with “outer” perception, there begins to be 
movement and flexibility in our inner pic-
turing. 
It is by this means that consciousness 
shifts, and one becomes a participant in the 
coming-into-being of the phenomenon ra-
ther than an onlooker observing a finished 
product. This shift of consciousness—
from static observations to unfolding pro-
cess—is the key to Goethe’s dynamic way 
of seeing. It is this different way of encoun-
tering nature that is Goethe’s most valua-
ble potential contribution for deepening 
our understanding today [12]. 
 
Goethe’s prism experiments 
We can get some idea of Goethe’s method 
by considering the experience of looking 
through a prism at a white rectangle with a 
black background. One sees colors at the 
rectangle’s horizontal edges: red, orange, 
yellow at one edge; violet and light blue at 
the other. 
When we begin looking, we tend to fo-
cus on distinguishing colors. We give at-
tention to the quality of each color and then 
try to do for ourselves, via exact sensorial 
imagination, what nature provides via di-
rect experience. We visualize the colors at 
each edge, seeing them together in the or-
der in which they appear. By making our-
selves reproduce the phenomenon we have 
seen in our mind’s eye imaginatively, we 
become aware of an aspect of the colors 
subtler than their separation into “red,” 
“orange,” “yellow,” and so forth. 
One comes to realize that the colors are 
not just juxtaposed externally but belong 
together. There is a “belongingness” 
among the colors at the two edges not vis-
ible in sense experience alone. One can ex-
press this quality by calling it “unity with-
out unification” (though perhaps “whole-
ness” is preferable to “unity” here). 
One can recognize this “belongingness” 
in Heidegger’s distinction between “be-
longing together” and “belonging to-
gether.” In the former, the “belonging” de-
termines the “together,” whereas in the lat-
ter the “together” determines the “belong-
ing.” In the latter case, we may “together” 
things that don’t “belong” or simply miss 
the way in which things already “belong” 
independently of any attempt on our part to 
“together” them [13]. 
In workshops, it happens quite often that 
one or two participants spontaneously ex-
perience a “movement” in the colors at the 
edges. For example, one participant might 
say that “the colors seem to grow out of 
one another,” or someone else suggests 
that “the boundaries of the colors have dis-
solved, and I feel like I’m ‘swimming’ 
from one color into another.” 
Goethe himself commented that no color 
can be considered as stationary [14]. For 
participants not coming to this shifting pat-
tern directly, one can provide a “guided” 
visualization from white to pale yellow, or-
ange, red, and black, and then the reverse. 
Practicing this shifting pattern of visualiz-
ing helps to facilitate a flexibility of seeing 
[15]. 
Working with exact sensorial imagina-
tion in this dynamic way has the effect of 
strengthening the initially weak sense of 
the colors belonging together. One result is 
that we begin to experience a quality of ne-
cessity in the colors. Instead of red, orange, 
and yellow experienced as merely contin-
gent—as if the order of these colors were 
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just accidental—we experience the order 
in the qualities as necessary. 
One way to become more aware of this 
non-contingent belonging is to visualize an 
incorrect color sequence—e.g., red, blue, 
yellow. Most participants recognize that 
this arrangement simply does not fit: “The 
blue popped out when I tried to make it go 
between red and yellow. And the blue 
makes a separation between the red and 
yellow. They no longer seem together” 
[16]. It is crucial to our understanding of 
Goethe’s way of science that we can come 
to have the experience of necessity of the 
phenomenon itself. We are familiar with 
this requirement in mathematics, to which 
it is usually supposed that the intuition of 
necessity is restricted. 
It is here that Goethe’s way of science 
becomes phenomenological instead of be-
ing either phenomenal-empirical or hypo-
thetical-speculative. In both the latter situ-
ations, one goes outside the phenomenon 
to introduce elements of another kind from 
outside the domain of color qualities them-
selves—e.g., wavelengths and their instru-
mental measurement. 
In rephrasing the phenomenon in these 
ways, there is no longer any necessity 
within the phenomenon. It has been con-
verted into something other than itself. 
When we see the necessity, then it is part 
of understanding the phenomenon that 
there is no need to look beyond it for any-
thing further. This point is very difficult to 
explain to anyone who has not yet had the 
experience of necessity [17]. 
A corollary is that, when we have not 
reached the experience of necessity, then 
we feel impelled to search for some expla-
nation external to the phenomenon. One 
recognizes this importance of necessity in 
Goethe’s often-quoted remarks: 
 
▪ Let the facts themselves speak for their 
theory. 
▪ Don’t look for anything behind the 
phenomena; they are themselves the 
theory. 
▪ The greatest achievement would be to 
understand that everything factual is 
already its own theory [18]. 
 
The Urphänomen 
There is an awkward point in workshops 
on Goethe’s approach to color in which 
participants must make a transition from 
the experiential investigation to what Goe-
the called the Urphänomen—the primal or 
archetypal phenomenon of color. Goethe 
does not mention this transition in “Contri-
butions to Optics” (1792), in which he lim-
its himself to an investigation of the for-
mation of colors at different boundaries 
when seen through the prism [19]. 
The “awkward point” is that the intro-
duction of the primal phenomenon seems 
like a discontinuity—a sudden jump in see-
ing. For sure, the workshop leader can 
smooth this transition over as a conjuror 
does when he comes to a “gap” in his per-
formance that he covers in a way that spec-
tators don’t notice. But the fact remains 
that Goethe does not describe how he came 
to his claim regarding the Urphänomen 
that “One instance is worth a thousand, 
bearing all within itself”—a claim that, in 
relation to color, he found in the shifting 
colors of the sun and sky [20]. 
Goethe speaks of this jump from lived 
experiences of color to the broader Ur-
phänomen as an aperçu—a sudden mo-
ment of insight and understanding. But this 
explanation does not tell us how Goethe 
came to relate these particular facts—i.e., 
the changing colors of the sun and sky—to 
the original prism experiments [21]. 
This recognition that there must be an 
“instance worth a thousand, bearing all 
within itself,” indicates that Goethe’s way 
of proceeding is phenomenological rather 
than empirical. An empirical procedure 
would collect many different instances of a 
phenomenon and compare them to find 
something they had in common. The pres-
ence of this commonality would then be 
taken to be essential for the occurrence of 
the phenomenon. An empirical approach 
involves induction—i.e., generalization 
arising from many cases. 
In a phenomenological approach, in con-
trast, only one instance is needed to see 
what is essential. The difference is that, 
phenomenologically, we see the necessary 
principle in the facts. We do not infer, de-
duce, or construct this principle but see it 
directly. This is not to say that such seeing 
always happens clearly at once. Rather, the 
recognition will more likely be achieved 
only with difficulty because, in many in-
stances, there will be contingent and acci-
dental factors that obscure what is neces-
sary and essential. 
What is needed is an instance in which 
these “asides” are reduced to such a degree 
that what is necessary and essential—i.e., 
the pure phenomenon—shines forth in see-
ing. This is the phenomenological ground-
ing for the “One instance worth a thousand, 
bearing all within itself.” 
 
Universal and particular together 
What we realize in Goethe’s phrasing here 
is the emphasis on the universal in the par-
ticular. We don’t see the particular as just 
an instance of the universal in the way that 
a particular triangle is an instance of the 
universal “triangle.” Rather, we see the 
universal in the particular so that, instead 
of being merely an instance of the univer-
sal, the particular becomes a “window” 
through which we see the universal. Or we 
might say that the particular is a “mirror” 
in which the universal appears. 
This seeing is twofold—i.e., simultane-
ously universal and particular. Crucially, 
however, there is no separation. The uni-
versal is twofold but non-dual; it is not “be-
hind” the particular and separate from it. 
The philosopher Ernst Cassirer empha-
sized that, for Goethe, “the particular and 
the universal are not only intimately con-
nected but… they interpenetrate one an-
other.” Goethe said that “The universal and 
the particular coincide: the particular is the 
universal itself appearing under different 
conditions.” The mode of consciousness 
that sees the universal in the particular is 
“inside out” to that which sees the particu-
lar as merely an instance of the universal. 
In relation to Goethe’s color studies, one 
realizes that, via the varying colors of sun 
and sky, we see how colors arise from light 
and dark alone—the darker colors arising 
from light overcoming darkness; the 
lighter colors, from darkness overcoming 
light. The qualities of the different colors 
become intelligible in themselves. 
In addition, the order of the colors be-
comes intelligible, and the quality of ne-
cessity is now grounded in the coming into 
being of the phenomenon itself—as also 
does the experience of the belonging to-
gether of the colors, particularly the two 
different edge-color phenomena, which are 
now seen to belong together as a dynamic 
polarity. 
Where with the senses we see separate-
ness, we can simultaneously see whole-
ness—as we now see the wholeness of the 
yellow sun and the blue sky, which are oth-
erwise just juxtaposed facts. Where before 
there was only contingency, there is now 
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necessity grounded in the coming into be-
ing of the phenomenon. 
This dynamic relationship is seen espe-
cially when the “poles” of the two color 
edges are brought together and green ap-
pears [22]. Now for the first time we have 
the colors that Newton described as the 
“spectrum of light” and that he took as the 
beginning of his investigation. But now, 
instead of being just a contingent arrange-
ment of colors, this spectrum is a necessary 
whole and intelligible as such. Each color 
is intelligible in itself and hence in relation 
to the others, in terms of its coming into 
being. 
Newton wrote about the origin of the 
colors seen with the prism, but the so-
called “spectrum of light” that he took as 
his starting point is a secondarily derived 
phenomenon instead of the simple phe-
nomenon he took it to be. He began with 
what is in fact already a “finished product” 
that he then tried to explain by projecting 
the colors back into light, imagining them 
already there but not visible until separated 
by the action of the prism. Newton’s claim 
was that the prism simply brings out what 
is already there [23]. 
Newton’s understanding here reminds 
one of the person who, in Rumi’s saying, 
tries to “reach the milk by way of the 
cheese.” What Newton claims about the 
origin of color is like saying that cheese 
comes from milk because it is in the milk 
already. He no more describes the origin of 
color than this saying describes the origin 
of cheese. 
Goethe, on the other hand, does describe 
the origin of color. He shows how the col-
ors are “excited” in the light when condi-
tions are right. When conditions cease, the 
colors cease. Instead of starting with a phe-
nomenon that is a “finished product”—the 
so-called spectrum of colors—he follows 
through the coming into being of this phe-
nomenon. In doing so, he consciously par-
ticipates in the phenomenon instead of re-
maining an independent onlooker. 
 
Different movements of thinking 
In making this transition from the phenom-
enon in its finished state to its coming into 
being, Goethe ends up where we usually 
begin. What he does, in effect, is to go back 
“upstream” and “flow down” again to fin-
ish where the standard Newtonian explana-
tion begins, a direction of understanding 
that simply flows further “downstream” 
while giving the illusion that it is returning 
to the source by back-projecting the fin-
ished product into the origin. 
There are two quite different movements 
of thinking here. If we cannot transform 
from the product into the producing, then 
our efforts at explanation can only take us 
further away from what we imagine they 
take us toward. The result is Goethe’s dy-
namic mode of consciousness: to follow 
the coming into being of the phenomenon 
instead of beginning with the phenomenon 
in its finished state. This different way of 
seeing and thinking may be his most im-
portant contribution to our understanding 
today. 
 
From the whole into the parts 
Goethe’s way of seeing dynamic whole-
ness is encapsulated in his remark to Schil-
ler that there must be a way of seeing na-
ture that “presented her as working and 
alive, striving out of the whole into the 
parts”(my emphasis). We notice here a re-
versal in perception: not from the parts to 
the whole, but from the whole into the 
parts. The parts are seen within the whole, 
instead of seeing the whole arise out of the 
parts. This way of seeing nature, “striving 
out of the whole into the parts,” is illus-
trated by Goethe’s own work on the meta-
morphosis of flowering plants and also in 
current Goethean research—e.g., Craig 
Holdrege, Mark Riegner, and Wolfgang 
Schad’s interest in the wholeness of the an-
imal organism and the organization of 
mammals as an organic whole [24]. 
There are two common misunderstand-
ings of Goethe’s way of seeing the meta-
morphosis of flowering plants. First, there 
is the misunderstanding that what he meant 
by metamorphosis is a historical or procre-
ational change—i.e., that one organ 
changes directly into a different organ as if, 
for example, a petal changes into a stamen. 
This misunderstanding has been particu-
larly encouraged by erroneously thinking 
about Goethe in Darwinian terms. 
The other misunderstanding is to sup-
pose that Goethe thinks of the different or-
gans up the stem—leaf, sepal, petal, sta-
men—as being formed on the same pattern 
according to a common plan. This so-
called “ground plan” is imagined to be 
what the different organs have in com-
mon—their lowest common denominator. 
It is supposed that this is what Goethe 
means by the Urorgan, a term often trans-
lated either as “primal organ” or “arche-
typal organ” (each of which is misleading 
in its own way, the first leading in the di-
rection of Darwinism; the second, in the di-
rection of Platonism). Similarly, when 
Goethe talks about the Urpflance, it is sup-
posed that he means what all the many dif-
ferent plants have in common—the group 
plan of all plants. Here, again, the terms 
“primal plant” and “archetypal plant” are 
misleading. 
These misinterpretations can be dis-
pelled by looking at what Goethe says 
(though he does not always help himself 
here) and, on this basis, learning to see the 
plant “striving out of the whole into the 
parts.” It will help to first consider what 
others have said about Goethe before con-
sidering what Goethe says himself. At the 
start, however, we should note that it is un-
realistic to consider Goethe in isolation 
from the context of his time, a period when 
the search for “archetypal forms” was a 
concern of many thinkers. In Germany, 
this interest was known as “transcendental 
morphology”; in France, “philosophical 
anatomy.” This approach extended to all 
organisms—for example, the attempt to 
find an archetypal form for all vertebrates 
(pursued especially by Richard Owen in 
England). 
Comments made about Goethe, there-
fore, are typical of what is said of the mor-
phological approach in general. In fact, 
Goethe (who coined the term “morphol-
ogy”) is almost invariably taken as repre-
sentative of this school of biological 
thought, even though his way of thinking 
is dynamical throughout and is different 
from the more static thinking of others with 
whom he is often associated in the search 
for archetypal forms in the organic world. 
 
An abstract, reductive unity 
Bearing this historical context in mind, the 
following are typical examples of the kind 
of thing said about Goethe, together with 
similar statements about the project of 
transcendental anatomy in general and the 
contribution of Richard Owen in particu-
lar. These examples are taken from books 
that happen to be on my shelves [25]: 
 
“Goethe searched for the ideal archetype 
of the vegetable world, the general plan 
common to all plants.” 
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“Goethe perceived the unity of plan or 
structure common to whole groups of or-
ganic beings.” 
 
“Goethe believed that nature, despite its 
diversity, was a manifestation of a single 
plan or ‘Idea’. Consequently, it was his ob-
ject to reveal the underlying unity of na-
ture.” 
 
“Seemingly influenced by Plato’s theory of 
Universals, Goethe was transfixed by uni-
formities and commonalities in nature.” 
 
“The distinguishing characteristic of tran-
scendental anatomy was the presupposi-
tion of an Ideal Plan or Type that lay be-
hind the great multiplicity of visible struc-
tures in the animal and plant kingdoms.” 
 
“For Owen, … nature’s plan could be 
demonstrated … by seeking the underlying 
unity beneath the diversity of living forms. 
He sought the ‘archetype’ or ground plan 
on which all forms of life, or at least the 
vertebrates, are modelled. The archetype 
was an idealized vision of the simplest form 
of living creature, from which the anato-
mists’ mind had been stripped the special-
ized organs required by real living be-
ings.” 
 
We can recognize what happens here by 
following the movement of thinking that 
produces these statements. We realize that 
this movement begins with the finished 
products, whether organs or organisms. 
This manner of thinking begins from a set 
of entities taken as given, and from there it 
can only go farther “downstream,” ab-
stracting from the entities what is “com-
mon.” Thus, by comparing any one organ 
or organism with another, this manner of 
thinking looks for similarities and rejects 
differences, until one can identify one fac-
tor as present in every organ or organism 
of the set. This factor is then taken as what 
the specific individuals all have in com-
mon. The result, therefore, is unity in the 
multiplicity. 
 Thus, beginning with a set of given or-
gans or organisms A, B, C … (that organi-
cally are “finished products”), we reconsti-
tute them in the form of αA', αB', αC' …, 
where α is what is common and where A', 
B', C' … comprise all about them that is 
different. This reconstitution can be repre-
sented in the drawing above, next column 
[26]. 
We come in this way to “unity and mul-
tiplicity” by the elimination of difference. 
The result is a unity that is abstract and re-
ductive because it abridges multiplicity to 
unity and diversity to identity by finding 
the respect in which the different “entities” 
(organs or organisms) don’t differ at all but 
are the same. This is the static unity of self-
sameness, generated by a manner of move-
ment—“unity in multiplicity”—that is the 
unity of the dead end. I repeat: 
 
“Unity in Multiplicity is the static unity 
of self-sameness.” 
 
With this movement of thinking, the “enti-
ties” can be anything whatsoever. In the 
early “Socratic” dialogues of Plato, for ex-
ample, they are virtues. The following quo-
tations are some other examples (at least in 
the form given to them by modern English 
translations). From these phrasings, one 
notes that the movement of thinking is to 
look for “unity in multiplicity”—a unity in 
which all differences are cancelled out, 
leaving only what is everywhere the same 
[27]: 
 
“What is that common quality, which is the 
same in all these cases, and which is called 
courage?” (Laches) 
 
“Isn’t it true that in every action piety is 
self-identical? … What I urged you to do 
was not to tell me about one or two of these 
many pious actions but to describe the ac-
tual feature that makes all pious actions pi-
ous. For you were in agreement, surely, 
that it is virtue of a single characteristic… 
that all pious things are pious.” (Eu-
thyphro) 
 
“We have discovered a number of virtues 
when we were looking for one only. This 
single virtue, which permeates each of 
them, we cannot find…. What is the char-
acter in respect of which they don’t differ 
at all, but are all the same?” (Meno) 
 
The idea of unity illustrated by these 
quotations is the unity of what is “com-
mon.” But the common property that con-
stitutes this unity is not separate from it but 
there in the multiplicity. The “unity in mul-
tiplicity” is part of the multiplicity of the 
given, being in fact a selection from the 
contents of the given and is, therefore, not 
in any way different or separate from the 
many individual entities (organs or organ-
isms). This is what is meant by saying that 
“unity in multiplicity” is an abstract unity. 
Yet if we look at expressions such as 
“the underlying unity beneath the diver-
sity” or “an Ideal Plan or Type that lies be-
neath the multiplicity,” we realize that the 
very form of this phrasing introduces a sep-
aration between the unity and the multi-
plicity, as if the unity had been hyposta-
sized into an abstract object itself. It is as if 
the idea of unity as what is common to 
many had “solidified” into a mental im-
pression of the common property as an ab-
stract entity and, as such, is separate from 
the multiplicity given to experience. 
This manner of understanding produces 
a “doubling” of the world—an unneces-
sary duplication that is the source of meta-
physics. The implication is always that the 
unity “behind” or “underlying” the multi-
plicity is in some way superior to, or more 
fundamental than, the multiplicity itself. In 
this way, a two-world theory develops that 
incorporates an ontological dualism: The 
unity is more real than the multiplicity 
even though it is the latter that is the more 
immediately visible. 
The most influential example is the phil-
osophical tradition of Platonism, which 
cannot by any means necessarily be identi-
fied with Plato himself in any straightfor-
ward way. In Platonism, we encounter the 
primary reality of Forms or Ideas over the 
reality of visible objects that are secondary. 
The relation of the unitary platonic arche-
type to the multiplicity of sensory ob-
jects—e.g., Beauty to the things that are 
beautiful—is referred to as “being the one 
over many.” Here, the unity is made trans-
cendent and, as Aristotle pointed out, the 
result is an unnecessary duplication of the 
world of sense objects, since, in its crude 
aspect, the reality of Forms or Ideas is 
clearly derived from the very sense world 
whose true origin the Forms or Ideas are 
then back-projected as being. 
What we recognize here is the hyposta-
tization of the “unity in multiplicity” to “a 
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unity underlying multiplicity,” a situation 
of trying to “reach the milk by way of the 
cheese,” as a consequence of beginning 
from things in their finished state (the 
given) and then going farther “down-
stream” in abstraction, instead of reversing 
the movement of thinking so as to catch 
things in their coming-into-being and 




The unity in the manifold phenomenon ap-
pears in the form of a “law of nature” in 
science, where it also usually takes a math-
ematical form. Though such laws do not in 
fact have the form of “unity in multiplic-
ity,” they are nevertheless most often pre-
sented and understood as if they did. In it-
self, mathematical thinking is intrinsically 
dynamical, and its mode of unity is very 
different from the static unity of what 
things have in common. From the way, 
however, that mathematical thinking is 
seen afterward—from an awareness of the 
“finished product,” which sees only the re-
sults of mathematical thinking and not the 
dynamics of the thinking itself—it seems 
as if the mathematical laws of physics refer 
to what phenomena have in common, so 
that the unity in the phenomena that they 
characterize has the form of “unity in mul-
tiplicity.” 
Certainly, this is undeniably true of the 
way in which science is taught today. Take, 
for example, Galileo’s discovery that, for 
uniformly accelerated motion, the total dis-
tance traversed from the start of the motion 
is directly proportional to the square of 
time that has elapsed. It is simply supposed 
that, by experiment, this law was found to 
be the common factor in many instances. 
The history of science shows, however, 
that this law was not discovered in this way 
at all. In fact, the philosophy of science 
shows that it couldn’t have been discov-
ered in this way. Certainly, it can be pre-
sented afterward (beginning with the “fin-
ished product”) as if it had been, and there-
fore as if the unity in the phenomenon that 
this mathematical law represents has the 
form of “unity in multiplicity.” 
From this external point of view, it does 
seem to be the characteristic of mathemat-
ical laws of physics that they exclude the 
ways in which phenomena differ in favor 
of what they have in common. In relation 
to Galileo’s discovery just mentioned, this 
law is the same for all bodies moving with 
uniform acceleration (neglecting air re-
sistance), no matter how they differ in 
weight, size, physical nature, or chemical 
constitution; where they are on the earth 
(or anywhere else); whether or not they are 
moving; and so on. 
It is with Newton that this idea of the 
universality of science really caught hold 
of the imagination, and the idea of a unified 
science that applies to all natural phenom-
ena begins to have widespread influence, 
not only in science but in the entire West-
ern culture [29]. Newton’s first law of mo-
tion stipulates that “Every body….”—in 
other words, it is true regardless of all dif-
ferences whatsoever. In fact, the very term 
“body” in physics seems to denote a low-
est-common-denominator “thing” that has 
been stripped of all differences. 
But it was really Newton’s law of grav-
ity that captured the imagination and be-
came the very paradigm for the movement 
of thinking that finds “unity in multiplic-
ity” or “identity in diversity,” whereby the 
common factor within different phenom-
ena comes to be seen as what is “essential,” 
whereas the differences come to be seen as 
merely “superficial.” How utterly unex-
pected it was to discover that the proverbial 
apple falling from the tree, the moon orbit-
ing the earth, and the planets and comets 
circling the Sun (all of which are evidently 
so different), nevertheless have something 
in common with regard to which they don’t 
differ at all but are the same. And then to 
“discover” that this pattern applies to all 
bodies in the Universe! 
We are so accustomed to this line of 
knowledge that we not only fail to be sur-
prised but fail to notice the movement of 
thinking that it assumes. The point can be 
made by seeing this manner of understand-
ing through the eyes of someone from an-
other culture in which it has not become 
“second nature” to think in this way. One 
example is what Nobel-Laureate physicist 
T.D. Lee said when asked about his educa-
tional experiences in China before emi-
grating to America: 
 
Without hesitation, Lee replied that it was 
the concept of universality of physical laws 
that had struck him most deeply—the idea 
that physical laws applied to specific phe-
nomena here on earth, in one’s living room 
as well as on Mars, was new and compel-
ling…. [30]. 
 
Unity behind multiplicity 
In the historical development of science, 
the laws of nature have not only been un-
derstood as being the “unity in multiplic-
ity” but, more fundamentally, as being the 
unity underlying or behind the multiplicity. 
This perspective comes directly from the 
influence of Neoplatonism on the develop-
ment of modern science, with its emphasis 
on the mathematical, together with the in-
fluence of the Christian tradition [31].  
What this means is that the mathematical 
laws of nature are conceived as separate 
from, and acting externally upon, matter in 
the manner of the two-world metaphysics 
of Platonism. In this picture, it is the math-
ematical laws that are ontologically more 
fundamental. In other words, they act on 
matter—i.e., they are not intrinsic to matter 
but impose order on what otherwise is 
chaos. 
Thus, in the fashion of metaphysical du-
alism, these mathematical laws transcend 
the world they act upon and were identified 
as being thoughts in the Mind of God, who 
was therefore conceived as a divine math-
ematician with his priest, the physicist, il-
luminating the mathematical Plan of Crea-
tion. Although this identification with God 
has now dropped out of science—notwith-
standing the tendency of some mathemati-
cal physicists from Einstein to Hawking to 
resurrect it—the dualism that it entails has 
not dropped away. 
In some ways, this dualism is even 
stronger in contemporary physics than ever 
before—for example, the fundamental 
equations of a unified field theory are 
thought by some physicists to be independ-
ent from, and ontologically prior to, the 
material universe itself. This claim often 
seems strange to laypeople who suppose 
that physicists discovered mathematical 
laws from an investigation of the intrinsic 
properties of matter itself—i.e., these laws 
are not beyond matter but essentially part 
of it. This puzzlement is reasonable, even 
though, if the laws of nature had not been 
conceived as being separate from the mat-
ter they act upon, and if the intrinsic nature 
of matter had had to be understood first, 
then more than likely modern Western sci-
ence would not have developed at all. 
Again, a comparison with the Chinese 
situation makes this point clear. In tradi-
tional Chinese culture, the belief was that 
order developed spontaneously in the 
world, out of the intrinsic character of the 
28





things themselves. Thus, the Chinese idea 
of law was that it was latent within things 
and not imposed from without. Hence, 
since everything had its own law, there was 
no idea of universal law in the Western 
sense. Consequently, the kind of scientific 
thinking that developed in China was very 
different from modern Western science 
[32]. 
This kind of thinking was subsequently 
extended from the physical to the organic 
sciences. The idea was to find the morpho-
logical laws of organisms, which would be 
for biology what the mathematical laws 
were for physics. The result would be biol-
ogy as a properly based science as physics 
already was. 
As suggested by the quotations I pre-
sented earlier, the kind of unity looked for 
in morphology was the “unity in multiplic-
ity” formed when the movement of think-
ing begins with the finished products. As 
in the case of physics, however, this as-
sumption did not stop at simply discover-
ing what different organs or organisms had 
in common. This “common plan” was very 
often made transcendental—i.e., as a unity 
underlying or behind the multiplicity. This 
archetype was conceived as being separate 
from the organs or organisms that it orga-
nized, like the mathematical laws of phys-
ics. This archetypal understanding could 
play the role in biology equivalent to that 
played by the laws of physics. 
 
Thinking moving upstream 
We have already seen that Goethe is often 
associated with this manner of understand-
ing. We will now see, however, that the 
movement of his thinking is entirely differ-
ent—in fact, it moves in the opposite direc-
tion. To provide this understanding, we 
will follow the same procedure as before 
by looking at some of Goethe’s statements. 
Once again, it is a matter of following the 
movement of thinking grounding these 
claims [33]: 
 
“Hypothesis: All is leaf. This simplicity 
makes possible the greatest diversity.” 
 
“It has occurred to me that in the organ of 
the plant that we ordinarily designate as 
leaf the true Proteus is hidden, who can 
conceal and reveal himself in all forms. 
Forward and backward the plant is only 
leaf.” 
 
Nature “produces one part of another and 
creates the most varied forms by the modi-
fication of one single organ.” 
 
“The process by which one and the same 
organ presents itself to us in manifold 
forms has been called the metamorphosis 
of plants.” 
 
“It is a growing awareness of the Form 
with which, again and again, nature plays 
and, in playing, brings forth manifold 
life.” 
 
“The thought becomes more and more liv-
ing that it may be possible out of one form 
to develop all plant forms.” 
 
In these descriptions, we see nature 
“working and alive, striving out of the 
whole into the parts” and not just what the 
parts have in common externally. Instead 
of beginning from the “given” (the finished 
organs or organisms) and going farther 
“downstream” to abstract what is common, 
Goethe’s thinking moves “upstream” and 
“flows” down with the coming-into-being 
of the phenomenon. Consequently, he ends 
with “the given” that, in contrast, is the ar-
bitrary point of departure for modes of 
thinking assuming “multiplicity in unity.” 
This facilitation of coming-into-being is 
the dynamic thinking of the participant 
mode of consciousness instead of the static 
thinking of onlooker consciousness. What 
we see is the dynamical unity of the com-
ing-into-being instead of the static unity of 
the finished products. We could say that 
this result is the dynamic unity of the living 
source instead of the static unity of the 
dead end. 
This way of seeing turns the one and the 
many inside out. Instead of many different 
ones that are the same, we now see one that 
is becoming itself in many different ways. 
What is important to understand is that 
each of these different manifestations is the 
one itself and not another one—it is other 
but not another. 
What we have here is self-difference in-
stead of self-sameness, whereby each is the 
very same one but differently instead of 
each the different ones being the same. If 
we follow this movement of thinking, we 
begin to see in the mode of consciousness 
corresponding to this concrete idea of or-
ganic unity instead of the unity of abstrac-
tion. This shift is the important step to 
make because, otherwise, we cannot see 
the dynamical unity of self-difference. We 
do not realize how fundamentally different 
this situation is from the static unity of self-
sameness [34]. 
 
Multiplicity in Unity 
Following the growth of a plant in imagi-
nation is one accessible way to discover 
this dynamical movement of thinking [35]. 
The procedure is the same as in the work 
on color: active seeing followed by exact 
sensorial imagination [36]. When we prac-
tice this method of looking and seeing, we 
find that we begin to experience the plant 
“striving out of the whole into the parts.” 
The idea of the dynamical unity of self-dif-
ference forms as a movement in our mind 
as if it were the plant itself doing this 
movement. 
We now have difference within unity ra-
ther than a unity that excludes difference. 
Furthermore, this mode of “seeing” is con-
crete rather than abstract. Instead of a 
“unity in multiplicity,” we have “multiplic-
ity in unity, which is the unity of the living 
source: 
 
“Multiplicity in Unity” is the dynamical 
unity of self-difference. 
 
We must be careful here not to think of 
“multiplicity in unity” as if it implied that 
unity is divided—in which case, it would 
not be unity. This error happens if we think 
of “multiplicity in unity” in an extensive 
sense (as we would think of “unity in mul-
tiplicity”). Rather, if the unity is not to be 
divided, “multiplicity in unity” must be in-
tensive, a situation that can be understood 
via simple examples such as dividing a hol-
ogram or propagating a plant by means of 
cuttings [37]. 
For example, we can contrast holograms 
and photographs. If we cut a photograph in 
two, we have two halves with half its im-
age on each piece. When we cut a holo-
gram in two, however, we have, astonish-
ingly, two holograms with the whole image 
on both parts (though those images are 
somewhat less clear than the original im-
age). We have divided the hologram mate-
rially but, optically, it remains one. 
Clearly, there are two holograms materi-
ally but, since each is the original whole, 
there is, in some sense, one hologram only. 
We easily miss what is happening in this 
hologram example because of our in-
grained habit of thinking in terms of the 
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logic of solid bodies. The arithmetic of 
wholeness is very different from the arith-
metic of bodies. This difference points to 
how we must think intensively rather than 
extensively: it’s not one and another one 
(two) but one and its own other (not two 
but one). In the intensive dimension of 
wholeness, something can be one and 
many at the same time—both same and 
other. This situation means that ontology is 
“free from the limitation of single-valued 
existence” [38]. 
Perhaps the best we can say is that each 
is the very same one and not another one, 
but this is not the best we can do because 
we can see it in the phenomenological 
sense. Comparing the hologram with a 
photograph helps to make this point in that, 
to achieve the same result photograph-
ically, we would have to make a copy of 
the original photograph and then there 
would be two because the copy is another 
one and not the other of the one. 
 
Indivisibility of the whole 
This process of hologram division illus-
trates the mode of unity that I call “multi-
plicity in unity.” The value of such an ex-
ample is that it can form a template for 
thinking in a new way—in this case, help-
ing us to think intensively instead of exten-
sively. In such cases, however, we must be 
careful not to confuse the container with 
the content. One way to avoid this diffi-
culty is to use several different examples. 
For example, vegetative reproduction by 
taking plant cuttings is another illustration 
that can help us to see the intensive “mul-
tiplicity in unity.” Here, again, we tend to 
miss what is happening because our cus-
tomary thinking is attuned to the external 
world of solid bodies. If we divide a fuch-
sia plant into pieces and grow them all, we 
have many new fuchsia, each separate 
from the others spatially. Organically, 
however, they belong together because 
each is the same plant. There is “inten-
sively one” plant organically, but we see 
“extensively many” plants that can be 
counted physically. 
Here, again, we have the indivisibility of 
the whole, which can be divided but re-
mains whole. No matter how many plants 
we can count, in the intensive dimension of 
wholeness there is One plant that is many 
but not many ones. What we discover here 
is that there is an intensive dimension of 
One instead of the extensive dimension of 
many ones. 
For convenience, we shall adopt the con-
vention of distinguishing the intensive One 
from the extensive one by capital and small 
letters. Thus “multiplicity in unity” is an 
intensive dimension within the One. Nei-
ther one nor many but at the same time 
both: This is the intensive dimension of 
One with the others of itself—“multiplicity 
in unity” instead of the extensive dimen-
sion of one and another one. 
Evidently, this intensive aspect cannot 
be mapped onto the bodily world; thus, we 
cannot form any sense-based mental pic-
ture of it. But we can see it in the phenom-
enological sense, though it takes practice to 
be able to do so, partly because we must set 
aside the habit of forming mental pictures 
based on the bodily world we encounter 
through the senses [39]. 
 
Thinking intensively 
Admittedly, the holographic and plant il-
lustrations are somewhat static, but they 
are only intended to help us think inten-
sively rather than extensively. If we exam-
ine Goethe’s statements quoted earlier, we 
see that they express a more dynamical 
quality. Here we see “multiplicity in unity” 
directly as the dynamical unity of self-dif-
ference. 
At first reading, however, we might miss 
the way that it is always the one organ or 
organism manifesting different forms of it-
self. In other words, it is always the same 
organ or organism ontologically because 
existence is not single-valued in the inten-
sive dimension of One. Some of these 
statements might be read in the extensive 
manner, in which case the differences 
would not be seen intensively as the One’s 
differences but extensively as the differ-
ence of one organ or organism from an-
other—i.e., existence is now single-valued 
so that there are many organs or organisms 
with a common factor among them. 
What Goethe means, however, by “met-
amorphosis” is this dynamical unity of 
self-difference—the intensive movement 
that produces the intensive dimension of 
One that is “multiplicity in unity.” This is 
how Goethe’s description of the inner ac-
tivity of imagination should be understood: 
 
When I closed my eyes and lowered my 
head, I could imagine a flower in the centre 
of my visual sense. Its original form never 
stayed for a moment; it unfolded and from 
within it new flowers continuously devel-
oped with coloured petals and green leaves 
[40]. 
 
What is important here is that the expe-
rience Goethe describes is intrinsically dy-
namical. It is not one plant followed by an-
other and another with a result that is an 
extensive sequence of different plants. Ra-
ther, Goethe describes One plant be-ing it-
self differently [41]. What we must do here 
is “to give up thinking in terms of beings 
that do and think instead of doings that be” 
[42]. This formative doing—the be-ing of 
the plant—is the self-producing “forming 
itself according to itself” for which Goethe 
adopted the term “entelechy.” 
Furthermore, since Goethe did not ac-
cept a purely representational theory of 
knowledge (i.e., a Cartesian/Kantian epis-
temology), we should try to avoid reading 
what he says in the light of a subject-object 
dualism. Thus the “movement that takes 
place in imagination”—i.e., the effusions 
of plants—is not merely subjective but is 
in fact the intrinsically dynamical One 
plant be-ing itself imaginally instead of 
materially. 
It is a consequence of the disciplined 
practice of imagination that the phenome-
non (in this case, the coming-into-being of 
the One plant) can form itself imagina-
tively so that what is being experienced is 
literally the self-manifesting of the phe-
nomenon itself and not just a mental repre-
sentation of it. This seems strange to us 
moderns—especially when we conven-
iently forget about the intractable difficul-
ties with a representational theory of 
knowledge. 
But hermeneutic philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer reminds us that “this in-
volvement of knowledge in being is the 
presupposition of all classical and medie-
val thought,” which is understood as 
“knowledge as an element of being itself 
and not primarily as an attitude of the sub-
ject” [43]. It is within the context of this 
hermeneutic tradition that Goethe’s fol-
lowing remarks are to be understood: 
 
Through the contemplating of an ever-cre-
ating nature, we should make ourselves 
worthy of conscious participation in her 
production. 
 
There is a delicate empiricism that makes 
itself utterly identical with the object, 
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thereby becoming true theory. But this en-
hancement of our mental powers belongs 
to a highly evolved age. 
 
An undivided wholeness 
If we return to Goethe’s work on morphol-
ogy, we realize what he means when he 
suggests that the organs up a plant’s stem 
can be perceived in the mode of  One or-
gan’s metamorphosing into different 
modes of itself, whereupon the visible se-
quence of organs can then be seen as a 
whole movement of which these organs are 
simply “snapshots.” There is a reversal of 
perception in this way of seeing: The 
movement is not made out of the sequence 
of organs, but the organs are “made out of” 
the movement—for example, physicist 
David Bohm’s holomovement, which he 
described as “undivided wholeness in 
flowing movement” [44]. 
What is perhaps most important to em-
phasize here is the way this manner of see-
ing illustrates the true phenomenological 
character of Goethe’s way of science. We 
see the discrete particulars and their intrin-
sic connection with twofold vision [45]. In 
this case, the necessary connection is dy-
namical: It is the whole movement, of 
which the individual organs now appear as 
arrested stages. There is a single form, but 
it is not what the particular organs have in 
common and it is not what is “behind” the 
appearances. Rather, it is the unity that is 
the whole movement whereby the single 
form is not static but dynamical. A com-
mon form could not generate the move-
ment, whereas here it is the movement that 
generates particular forms. As Brady 
writes, 
 
Thus the movement is not itself a product 
of the forms from which it is detected, but 
rather the unity of those forms, from which 
unity, any form belonging to the series can 
be generated [46]. 
 
Furthermore, we can now see why any 
form belonging to the series (whether of 
leaves only or all organs up the stem) can 
be taken as representing all others in the se-
ries. Each part is a manifestation of the 
whole (“striving out of the whole into the 
parts”) so that each member of the series is 
the One organ metamorphosing into differ-
ent modes of itself. Thus, any organ of the 
series can function as a concrete symbol 
for all others, and the entire series incorpo-
rates a dynamical unity of self-difference 
that generates an intensive dimension of 
One. 
This is what Goethe meant when he said 
that “All is leaf.” Because of the habit of 
thinking in the mode of “unity in multiplic-
ity,” this statement is usually interpreted as 
implying somehow a common plan, with 
the term “leaf” referring to a kind of gen-
eralized image formed by abstraction. If re-
ally engaged with Goethe’s meaning, how-
ever, we realize that this interpretation is 
like trying to fit a square peg into a round 
hole. 
The reason for this dissonance is now 
clear: Goethe thinks of the organs, not as a 
set of finished products to be compared 
but, rather, as a “coming-into-being” series 
produced by the One organ metamorphos-
ing into different modes of itself. The re-
sult is that any one mode of this organ can 
function as a concrete symbol representing 
the entire series thus generated. Alter-
nately, we may say that this diversely met-
amorphosed organ has no name and moves 
through the series in both directions (e.g., 
a stamen is a contracted leaf; or a leaf, an 
expanded stamen). Whichever way, what 
is important is the dynamical wholeness of 
the series of organs and not what members 
of the series have in common. 
 
Participating in thinking 
The difference between the concrete dy-
namical wholeness of the series and the ab-
stract common factor of a set was recog-
nized very early on by philosopher Ernst 
Cassirer. He saw that, although universal 
concepts were traditionally (i.e., in the em-
pirical tradition) supposed to be formed by 
the abstraction of a common factor, this 
widely held view was intrinsically contra-
dictory because it presupposed the very 
concepts the origins of which it sought to 
explain. 
Cassirer recognized that, more funda-
mentally, concepts in mathematics and 
mathematical science took the form of a se-
ries rather than a common factor. Once the 
general principle is known, then far from 
eliminating differences, it is possible to 
generate all the different possibilities. In 
other words, the particular cases in their 
concrete totality can be evolved from the 
concept so that the concept can be said to 
include diversity within itself. In short, the 
concept is a concrete universal instead of 
the abstract universal of the empirical tra-
dition [47]. 
Although Cassirer does not mention 
Goethe directly, it is nevertheless clear that 
what he says about the form of universal 
concepts is very much in accord with the 
way that Goethe understood the dynamical 
wholeness of the organism. As Gerry Web-
ster and Brian Goodwin explain, “Cassi-
rer’s important concept of ‘serial form’ 
seems to have been anticipated, if only in-
tuitively, informally, and obscuring, by 
Goethe in his ‘Theory of Metamorphosis’” 
[48]. Webster and Goodwin draw on phi-
losopher Ron Brady‘s work to show how 
Goethe’s transformation series of organs is 
of a similar kind to Cassirer’s concept of 
serial form [49]. 
Though they discuss this link between 
Goethe and Cassirer, Webster and Good-
win also indicate how the two thinkers dif-
fer in that Cassirer ultimately assumed a 
representational theory of understanding 
that separates being and knowledge into 
different domains, with the latter restricted 
to the domain of cognitive representation. 
Consequently, Webster and Goodwin see 
Goethe’s phenomenology of organic form 
as emphasizing only “the epistemic order, 
the forms of thought in terms of which be-
ing is represented or described—the struc-
ture of a set of concepts or propositions—
and not to the forms of being per se, the 
ontological order” [50]. 
To some extent, the tendency to depend 
on a representational theory of knowledge 
is itself a consequence of failing to incor-
porate a dynamical mode of consciousness 
in scientific thinking. The reductive result 
is that thinking remains in the onlooker 
mode of consciousness and consequently 
too closely tied to things in their finished 
state. As a result, the question of 
knowledge becomes that of how we can 
know things that have already become with 
the result that the subject-object dualism of 
representational theory seems quite “natu-
ral.” 
In contrast, a dynamical mode of con-
sciousness invokes a participation in 
“thinking the coming-into-being of things” 
and encountering generatively what other-
wise we would only know as a completed 
product. In Goethe’s manner of seeing, the 
coming-into-being of the phenomenon 
forms itself in thinking so that the dynam-
ical mode of understanding is no longer di-
vorced from the phenomenon. Knowledge 
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is no longer apart from being because 
knowledge is the phenomenon be-ing itself 
through thinking. Understanding becomes 
a part of being itself. 
 
The whole entering into each part 
When we are able to encounter nature 
“working and alive, striving out of the 
whole into the parts,” we come to see the 
whole reflected in the part because the part 
is an expression of the whole—literally a 
part-ial expression. When we look in this 
way, we really see the unity of nature as 
the dynamical unity of self-difference and, 
hence, in the mode of the intensive dimen-
sion of One. It is especially characteristic 
of what is living that, in philosopher Ron 
Brady’s succinct phrase, “It is becoming 
other in order to remain itself” (Brady 
1987, p. 286). 
Anyone can practice this way of seeing. 
For example, one can see a particular fam-
ily of plants in its organic mode. It is an 
enlivening experience to observe the dif-
ferent members of a family such as the 
Rosaceae (rose, blackberry, strawberry, 
apple, and so forth) and realize they are 
One plant in the form of “multiplicity in 
unity.” How different this experience is 
from that of looking for what these differ-
ent plants have in common! 
 
A Phenomenology of mammals 
Though Goethe’s way of seeing works sat-
isfactorily with plants, one finds it intensi-
fied when looking at animals. Here, we 
turn to the extraordinary work of biologist 
Wolfgang Schad (2019) and ecologists 
Craig Holdrege (1998, 2003, 2009) and 
Mark Riegner (1993, 1998, 2008, 2013). 
Their research provides some of the best 
examples of the phenomenology of nature 
that we yet have. This work is rooted in a 
Goethean approach yet developed and pre-
sented with only minimal reference to 
Goethe. This distancing is important if 
phenomenological research on the whole-
ness of nature is to develop into a real sci-
ence. What is not needed is making Goethe 
into some sort of romantic scientific hero, 
battling against mainstream Western sci-
ence. 
All the themes I have discussed here are 
exemplified in these animal studies when 
seen in the light of “multiplicity in unity” 
rather than “unity in multiplicity.” Schad’s 
book works as a “template” for thinking in 
a new way. His perceptive, readily under-
standable examples facilitate a new move-
ment of thinking. As one studies the book, 
he or she is astonished to see the wholeness 
of nature emerge in such a natural way that 
it seems as if it is there “in front of our very 
eyes” (but of course it is not). 
Schad’s way of seeing is so clear that 
I’m convinced it makes a far better intro-
duction to a Goethean phenomenology of 
nature than Goethe’s work on color that 
more often gets phenomenological atten-
tion [51]. When we see nature “striving out 
of the whole into the parts,” via Schad’s 
example of mammals, we see in a way that 
is “inside out” to what is usual. We see 
how the whole enters into each part, which 
is therefore a part-ial expression of the 
whole. 
This way of seeing naturally leads to a 
dynamical classification of the mammals 
instead of the static “pigeonhole” classifi-
cations with which we are more familiar. 
The difference between a thinking arising 
from a “coming into being” and a thinking 
arising from a “finished product” is expe-
rienced vividly in Schad’s account, which 
leads us to discover intrinsic relationships 
among mammals that otherwise would not 
be recognized. As Schad explains, 
 
Here, we witness the awesome inner logic 
of the organism and experience a diversity 
ordered in a living way and not merely 
schematized (Schad 2019, p. 4). 
 
In Schad’s understanding of mammals, we 
see the phenomenological science of na-
ture clearly—i.e., that it is phenomenolog-
ical in Husserl’s sense because it returns to 
“the things themselves.” Schad’s work on 
animal wholeness also exemplifies Witt-
genstein’s new kind of understanding (re-
placing explanation) that consists in seeing 
relationships—i.e., recognizing the way 
whereby things (in this case, mammals) 
“already stand in connection with one an-





The phenomenologist of nature sees the in-
trinsic relationships and necessary struc-
tures that, otherwise, would appear only 
externally as contingent facts. Holdrege’s 
research on the “whole organism” begins 
with Goethe’s remark that “Every creature 
has its own reason to be.” This phrase de-
scribes precisely what a phenomenological 
science of wholeness is about: giving at-
tention to seeing the “idea” of the organism 
(in the same sense that we say, in practical 
life, “I’ve got the idea of it now”). In a sim-
ilar way, Husserl used the term essence 
(Wesen) by which he meant not something 
hidden behind the appearances or some 
supposed inner core but the characteristic 
way of being of something that presents it-
self directly in experience. 
This is what Holdrege (2009) does so 
beautifully in his work on the sloth. He 
shows how the characteristic way of this 
creature’s being reveals itself through a 
range of manifestations so that “Every de-
tail can begin to speak ‘sloth’.” 
Phenomenology does not try to explain 
but to understand. It tries to catch sight of 
the intrinsic intelligibility of the phenome-
non (“its own reason to be”) instead of 
leaving the phenomenon and thereby ex-
plaining it by means of something outside 
itself. When we begin to see the whole an-
imal, then each of its details is seen to be 
consistent with the characteristic way of 
that animal’s being. 
For example, we see this characteristic 
way of being in the giraffe, a mammal that 
cannot be considered in isolation from 
other mammals if we are to come to expe-
rience the being-what-it-is. In other words, 
the giraffe must be seen in the context of 
all the other mammals within the order of 
ungulates. The most striking feature of the 
giraffe—its long neck—becomes intrinsi-
cally intelligible when one realizes that: 
 
The tendency [of ungulates] towards elon-
gation is carried to an extreme in a very 
particular way in the giraffe, which does 
not merely have a long neck. Rather, this 
length is mirrored in the formation of the 
rest of its body, especially in its very long 
legs (Schad 2019, p. 667). 
 
When the wholeness of the giraffe is 
seen, every detail begins to speak “gi-
raffe.” The long neck is now no longer seen 
as a contingent feature, an accidental de-
velopment resulting from random variation 
and natural selection but as a necessary ex-
pression of the characteristic way of being 
that is the giraffe. This “elongation” is con-
sistent with all the other necessary mani-
festations of the giraffe’s “being-what-it-
is” so that one recognizes a coherent whole 
in which no detail is contingent. No longer 
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is any creature just a bundle of accidental 
developments as claimed by current geno-
centric biology. 
It is a consequence of the way that mod-
ern biology developed that the organism as 
such has disappeared to be replaced by 
genes as the fundamental units of life [53]. 
As a counter to this reductive, genetic view 
of organism, an alternative “organo-cen-
tric” biology—i.e., a biology of the whole 
organism—cannot possibly be overesti-
mated. Even without considering the ge-
netic factor, the conventional tendency 
among biologists is to see organisms in a 
mechanical fashion—i.e., as an aggregate 
of parts rather than an organism-as-whole. 
One example is Holdrege’s study of the 
cow (Holdrege 2004, ch. 4), which demon-
strates how the isolation of a single fac-
tor—milk production—leads to unhealthy 
practices that would be ended immediately 
if we saw the organism as a whole and not 
just an aggregate of traits and functions. 
When the organism is seen as no more than 
an aggregate of bits, then it seems quite 
natural, now that biotechnology is availa-
ble, to simply change one part of the crea-
ture, independently of other parts. With ge-
netic engineering, this piecemeal manipu-
lation of organisms is commonplace. As 
Holdrege (1998, p. 230) concludes: 
 
In this respect, the ignorance of the life of 
organisms in our day is staggering, and 
Goethe’s approach is needed more than 
ever. 
 
One of the most significant values of 
Goethean science is countering this reduc-
tive, piecemeal approach to the natural 
world, particularly as one might facilitate 
research and education in Goethean phe-
nomenology. 
 
Appearance and being together 
By facilitating a “coming-into-being” ra-
ther than assuming a finished product, 
Goethe avoided a metaphysical dualism 
without falling into the flatland of positiv-
ism. He avoided separating being and ap-
pearance, where being is “behind” the ap-
pearance, without reducing everything to 
“merely” appearance. Instead, appearance 
is the manifestation of being [54]. 
Goethe’s dynamical mode of conscious-
ness is in tune with a development in think-
ing that has gradually developed over the 
last 200 years. There has been a shift away 
from thinking in terms of static endpoints. 
There has been a shift toward thinking in 
terms of coming-into-being.  
This dynamical mode of understanding 
is illustrated in quantum physics, which 
has moved away from thinking in terms of 
entities in their finished state. One example 
is the development of so-called “elemen-
tary particle” physics, which provides an 
exceptional illustration of the need to think 
in a dynamical, transformative way. Phys-
icist Werner Heisenberg never tired of 
pointing out that there really are no ele-
mentary particles comprising the ultimate 
building blocks of the universe or the ulti-
mate constituents of matter. He maintained 
that our familiar language of “division” 
and “consists of” is highly inappropriate 
and obstructs our understanding of the re-
markable processes actually taking place. 
Experiments with high-energy machines 
do not show the fragmentation of matter 
but, rather, its dynamical unity. All the dif-
ferent “particles” that appear are in fact 
mutable forms of one another and self-dif-
fering forms in which energy-matter can 
appear. 
What is observed in these revealing ex-
periments should be seen in the manner of 
the dynamical unity of self-difference, pro-
ducing “multiplicity in unity”—i.e., a 
mode of the intensive dimension of One. 
Instead of fragmentation, there is unity, al-
beit in a form that we weren’t expecting 
and therefore overlooked at first. On the 
other hand, when we say that such experi-
ments are revealing the fundamental build-
ing blocks of matter, we project our think-
ing backward and see the situation back-to-
front. In other words, we lose sight of the 
formative processes and only see instead 
the finished products—yet another in-
stance of trying to reach the milk by way 
of the cheese [55]. 
 
A dynamic phenomenology 
Instances of this dynamical way of 
thinking are not confined to science alone. 
In various ways, this approach is a hall-
mark of some of the major movements in 
twentieth-century philosophy, especially 
in the case of phenomenology. 
The shift of attention from what Husserl 
called “the natural attitude” to seeing the 
taken-for-grantedness of that natural atti-
tude has the effect that we catch (but not 
catch hold of) “the world” coming into be-
ing. We then see how “the world” is con-
stituted in experience, whereas, in the nat-
ural attitude, we begin at the end with the 
world as independent object (what is 
“given”) and then try to explain experience 
in terms of the world (instead of under-
standing the way that the world is consti-
tuted in experience). 
Beginning at the end, we ask how our ex-
perience “in here” is related to the world 
“out there.” Thus, we begin with the sepa-
ration of subject from object, whereas in 
phenomenological seeing, we catch the 
coming into being of this separation. We 
realize that any representational theory of 
knowledge based on this subject-object 
separation ends in a cul de sac because it 
starts from the end and therefore gets 
things “back-to-front.” Any representa-
tional theory of knowledge is another case 
of milk and cheese. 
A particularly good example of the dy-
namical mode of thinking typical of phe-
nomenology is provided by Gadamer’s un-
derstanding of hermeneutics, which begins 
with the coming into being of meaning in 
the event of understanding (rather than be-
ginning with meaning as a finished product 
in the author’s mind). By following the 
coming into being of meaning in the event 
of understanding, we discover that this ex-
perience takes the form of the dynamical 
unity of self-difference. When we see the 
way that Gadamer’s hermeneutics illus-
trates the dynamical unity of self-differ-
ence, we find the closeness to Goethe’s or-
ganics quite astonishing! 
 
Modes of counterfeit wholeness 
I end by emphasizing that the science of 
wholeness can take two counterfeit forms, 
the first of which is systems thinking, 
which ranges from Ludwig von Ber-
talanffy’s “general systems theory” (Ber-
talanffy 1968) to Ervin Laszlo’s “evolu-
tionary systems theory” (Laszlo 1987). 
Whatever its specific formulation, systems 
thinking claims to be a science of whole-
ness. These formulations are a “mechanis-
tic” counterfeit in the sense that, no matter 
how sophisticated, they ultimately fail to 
escape from the mechanistic paradigm 
they claim to counter—the so-called “Car-
tesian” or “Newtonian paradigm.” 
One key problem with systems thinking 
is that it sees things in isolation from one 
another and therefore ignores the ways in 
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which things already belong to-
gether. Unaware of this intrinsic 
relationality, these theorists ar-
bitrarily identify parts that are 
not really of the whole because 
they don’t belong [56].  
Holism is the second counter-
feit form of a science of whole-
ness. In contrast to systems the-
ory, holism overreaches the 
whole in that, whatever form it 
takes, this manner of under-
standing always turns wholeness 
into something metaphysical. 
Often irrational, mystical, and 
pseudo-spiritual, this manner of 
holistic thinking typically re-
jects science and has too often 
been used as a front for preju-
dice and domination, the most egregious 
example being Germany’s National So-
cialism. Too often Goethe has been un-
fairly associated with holism, as in the 
“Goethe against Newton” syndrome. This 
association has done much to harm Goe-
the’s remarkable contribution to the evolu-
tion of scientific thinking. 
I summarize the three contrasting ap-
proaches to wholeness via the diagram 
above. Note that in both counterfeit ver-
sions, the movement of understanding is 
away from the phenomenon as that phe-
nomenon is in itself. In contrast, Goethe’s 
approach moves into the parts as they illu-
minate the whole. An authentic science of 
wholeness as exemplified by Goethe’s 
phenomenological approach should today 
interest all individuals who aim to avoid 
the pitfalls of intellectualism, on one hand, 
and mystical pseudo-science, on the other. 
 
Notes 
1. At the time, because we were not aware of the 
phenomenological perspective, we were not able to 
make this distinction between seeing directly and see-
ing reduced to sense perceptions. 
2. And at the time, I knew nothing of Goethe either. 
3. During the time I worked with Bennett, we were 
influenced by Wittgenstein in the approach we took 
toward language, but his influence was mostly limited 
to our emphasizing the ways in which language can 
“sleepwalk” us into using concepts inappropriate for 
a given situation, leading one into confusion that he 
or she then mistakes for some difficulty in the situa-
tion itself—for example, a “problem” to be “solved.” 
This alternative way of seeing was very much “in the 
air” in Britain in the 1960s, but we were unaware of 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on a new kind of seeing—
i.e., an understanding that sees connections and thus 
removes any need for explanation. 
4. These strictures might have been because Bohr 
had absorbed the Kantian attitude. 
5. Kant’s motivation here may well have been that 
he hoped to save Newtonian mathematical physics 
not only from the skepticism of Humean empiricism 
but also from the claims of Swedenborgian “spirit 
seeing,” which for Kant posed an equal threat to what 
he saw as the greatest achievement of human 
knowledge—mathematical physics. 
6. The capacity to form mental images intention-
ally was crucial for Bennett, and he sometimes called 
the practice by the German word vorstellung. 
7. At a 1986 seminar at London’s Goethe Institute, 
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer declared that 
“Wittgenstein has the same kind of phenomenological 
imagination as Husserl.” Philosopher John Heaton 
told me that people in Vienna who knew Wittgenstein 
in the 1930s said that he was really doing phenome-
nology (and this at a time when, according to the 
standard Wittgenstein narrative, he was a logical pos-
itivist!). 
8. There are no grounds for this way of understand-
ing nature other than the elevation of the mathemati-
cal, for which, in turn, there are no grounds other than 
cultural-historical context. This situation did not stop 
thinkers from trying to offer foundations, but the key 
point is that there is no intrinsic scientific foundation. 
Descartes made the most notable effort to provide this 
foundation by arguing that the new science of mathe-
matical physics was grounded both ontologically and 
methodologically in God. For further discussion, see 
Bortoft 1996, chaps. 1–3. 
9. Note the two following passages from Goethe: 
 
An important task: to banish mathematical-philo-
sophical theories from those areas of physical science 
where they impede rather than advance knowledge, 
those areas where a one-sided development in mod-
ern scientific education has made such perverse use 
of them. 
 
I can receive mathematics as the most sublime and 
useful science, so long as they are applied in their 
proper place; but I cannot commend the misuse of 
them in matters which do not belong to their sphere, 
and in which, noble science as they are, they seem to 
be mere nonsense. As if, forsooth! Things only exist 
when they can be mathematically demonstrated. It 
would be foolish for a man not to believe his mistress’ 
love because she could not prove it to him mathemat-
ically. She can mathematically prove her dowry, but 
not her love! 
10. For a discussion of how this approach differed 
from Newton’s work on light and color, see Bortoft 
1996, pp. 205–07; pp. 223–26. Also see Bortoft 1971, 
1982, 1985, 1986, 2012, 2013. 
11. Exact sensorial imagination is often mislead-
ingly described as producing a mental image in con-
sciousness, whereas phenomenologically it is not a 
content of consciousness but a mode of consciousness 
and a special kind of intentionality. 
12. Hjalmar Hegge (1987) identified the practice 
of exact sensorial imagination as the means by which 
necessary connections can be seen within the domain 
of qualities. Mastering Goethe’s method of seeing and 
understanding amounts to a way of developing the 
mode of consciousness needed for Goethe’s way of 
science. In other words, the activity of Goethean sci-
ence is an educational activity. It is the education of a 
mode of consciousness. 
13. For a thorough explication of “belonging to-
gether” versus “belonging together,” see Bortoft, 
1996, pp. 3–26; 290–320. 
14. See Theory of Colours, ⁋ 772 (Goethe 1970). 
15. Older workshop participants sometimes have 
more difficulty with exact sensorial imagination, per-
haps because the capacity atrophies through lack of 
use. But it can be restored given time. 
16. Biologist Brian Goodwin first suggested this 
effort to visualize a wrong color sequence. 
17. The awkwardness is that we usually don’t rec-
ognize that we were experiencing the order as contin-
gent and accidental until after we have begun to ex-
perience the quality of necessity—a situation that 
makes describing this difference difficult. 
18. One thinks of related comments by Wittgen-
stein: “A phenomenon isn’t a symptom of something 
else. It is the reality” (Wittgenstein 1953, section 
126). Or “Since everything lies open to view, there is 
nothing to explain” (Wittgenstein 1964, p. 283). 
19. Goethe understood the Urphänomen of color to 
be the tension between light and darkness—what he 
described poetically as “colors as the deeds and suf-
ferings of light.” Lightness overcome by darkness 
leads to the lighter colors of yellow, orange, and red, 
while darkness overcome by lightness leads to the 
darker colors of blue and indigo. Goethe argued that, 
in nature, the Urphänomen could be seen in the sun’s 
shifting color—from yellow at midday to orange and 
red while setting; or in mountain ridges receding in 
the distance, with nearer ridges indigo and farther 
ridges blue. Goethe understood the blue of the sky as 
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the lightness of the atmosphere in front of the dark-
ness of outer space. 
20. See note 19. 
21. My guess is he found the idea of the Urphäno-
men in a book. This determination is not unusual—
Copernicus, for example, explained that he found the 
idea for the heliocentric universe in ancient books. In 
this sense, it is not what one finds but what he or she 
does with it that counts. We know that Goethe re-
searched thoroughly the history of color, and he may 
well have found his “One instance worth a thousand, 
bearing all within itself” in the writings of the Renais-
sance painters—Leonardo da Vinci perhaps? If this is 
true, it would explain why there seems to be such a 
“jump” when presenting Goethe’s work on color in 
workshops. Nevertheless, by whatever means Goethe 
came to it, the recognition that there is a connection 
between the prismatic colors and the colors of the sun 
and sky is an insight in itself. For further discussion 
of the Urphänomen, see Bortoft 1996, pp. 231–46. 
22. Significantly, when one uses the prism to view 
a black rectangle on a white background, one sees 
how the two colored edges move together in reverse 
order and “blend” to generate a new color—a ruby-
magenta, or “peach blossom,” that is the complemen-
tary color to green. One can now form a circle that 
marks Goethe’s color wheel based on complementary 
colors. The result is a circle that is a dynamic whole 
in which, as Goethe wrote, “no color can be consid-
ered stationary.” 
23. For a discussion of the ambiguities and hidden 
influences in Newton’s 1672 paper to the Royal Soci-
ety, see Bortoft 1996, pp. 192–212. 
24. For example, Holdrege 1998; Riegner 1993, 
1998, 2008; Schad 2019. 
25. No citations are provided for these quotations. 
26. Bortoft explains that, in this diagram, he adapts 
a notation used by Ernst Cassirer in Substance and 
Form (Cassirer 1980). 
27. No citations are provided for these quotations. 
28. There can be no transcendence without imma-
nence, or immanence without transcendence because 
each is the condition of possibility for the other. There 
is duality here but no dualism—no dichotomy as there 
is in the two-world theory, where each world is mutu-
ally external to the other. The difficulty arises from 
the counterfeit transcendence, which has the quality 
of externality and is therefore conceived as being sep-
arate from and outside the sense world, and hence as 
another “world” (see Miller 2005, esp. pp. 120–21). 
Significantly, Plato was not a Platonist—he did not 
subscribe to the two-world theory that is central to the 
Western metaphysical tradition. In view of this, we 
should perhaps refer to the Neoplatonic tradition, es-
pecially as it influenced the development of modern 
science from the Renaissance onward, as “pseudo-
Platonism” (See Bortoft 2012, pp. 158–59, pp. 183–
86). 
29. This idea of a unified science is the source of 
the Enlightenment idea of universality in human na-
ture and the belief in universal reason that can dis-
cover universal principles in morality, politics, and 
religion, as well as in science. 
30. Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 64. The impli-
cation here is not that Chinese culture is somehow de-
ficient. Rather, comparative studies illustrate that 
Chinese culture emphasizes aspects of phenomena 
different from those emphasized in modern Western 
culture, most notably giving priority to the uniquely 
particular rather than the underling unity. This differ-
ence means that the Chinese culture developed a 
mode of perception that we Westerners tend to lack, 
just as our Western culture has developed some 
modes of understanding not traditionally found in 
Chinese culture. 
31. And, subsequently, the emergence of the Na-
tion State, with its transition from common law to 
statute law. 
32. See Needleman, 1976. 
33. No citations are provided for these quotations. 
In his last entry of this list, Bortoft quotes Rudolf Stei-
ner (1963), who wrote that Goethe “seeks to bring the 
diversity back into the unity from which it originally 
went forth.” 
34. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “You know 
that you’ve seen it when you feel that your seeing has 
been turned inside out.” 
35. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “I have 
found a Busy Lizzie plant very helpful.” 
36. See Bortoft’s earlier discussion of active seeing 
and sensorial imagination. 
37. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “As simple 
as these examples are, it helps to think doing them in 
imagination instead of only thinking of the result.” 
38. Bortoft attributes this quotation to philosopher 
J.G. Bennett but does not provide a citation. On 
Bortoft’s relationship with Bennett, see the earlier 
part of this essay. 
39. The intensive dimension of One is no stranger 
than many of the “difficulties” we face in quantum 
physics—think, for example, of the interference ex-
periment with a single photon. The fact that we cannot 
map the intensive dimension of the One into a sensory 
representation does not mean that it is an abstraction. 
On the contrary, “multiplicity in unity” is a concrete 
unity, even though it cannot be recognized sensorily 
or caught in the logic of solid bodies. It is “unity in 
multiplicity” that is abstract. 
For further discussion of the hologram, see Bortoft 
1996, pp. 4–13. 
40. No citation is provided for this quotation. 
41. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “A some-
what more static (because non-living) ‘model’ is il-
lustrated by the construction of a multiple hologram, 
which lacks the intrinsically dynamical character of 
living being but does nevertheless demonstrate the 
notion of ‘multiplicity in unity’ in a way that imitates 
artificially the dynamical wholeness of living be-
ing”—see Bortoft 1996, Part 2, note 58. 
42. Bennett 1977, p. 64. Bennett’s precise phrasing 
is: “We can hardly bring ourselves to see that there 
are doings that be things. If I say something, it is not 
I that says it but that the speaking says me.” 
43. No citation is given for this quotation. For fur-
ther discussion of Gadamer, see Bortoft 2012, pp. 
121–26. 
44. See Bortoft 1996, pp. 283–89; Brady 1998. 
45. Bortoft 1996, pp. 303–20. 
46. No citation is given for this quotation; either 
Brady 1987 or 1998? 
47. This remarkably valuable insight is discussed 
in some detail in Cassirer’s early Substance and 
Function (Cassirer 1980). Although he does not ex-
plicitly consider the idea of a different mode of unity 
(so that he does not consider the generative serial con-
cept [as distinct from the abstract generic concept] in 
terms of the of the metamorphosis of One into differ-
ent modes of itself (i.e., producing an intensive di-
mension of One), Still, it is clear (even when not made 
explicit) that the movement of Cassirer’s thinking is 
away from entities in their finished state toward their 
coming-into-being. His thinking becomes dynamical. 
If one reads what he writes carefully, it becomes clear 
from the language he uses that sometimes he moves 
toward one mode in his thinking and, at other times, 
moves toward the other, sometimes getting caught 
more in the product (e.g., “the unification of multi-
plicity”) and, at other times, becoming free from this 
static sense and moving toward the processual (e.g., 
“we have to create this multiplicity”). 
48. Webster and Goodwin 1996, p. 110. 
49. Brady 1998. 
50. Webster and Goodwin 1996, p. 101. 
51. See Bortoft 1996, pp. 212–36. 
52. See the first part of this essay for Bortoft’s re-
marks on Wittgenstein. 
53. See Goodwin 1994. 
54. As Gadamer (1989, p. 484) explained, “being 
is self-presentation.” 
55. Bortoft draws on this phrase several times in 
Parts I–III of this series. 
56. In Wholeness of Nature, Bortoft (1996, p. 290) 
writes: “[Systems thinking] tries to put together what 
already belongs together. Thus, the intrinsic related-
ness is not seen, and instead, external connections are 
introduced with a view to overcoming separation. But 
the form of such connections is such that they, too, 
belong to the level of separation.” 
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Bortoft Lectures on-line 
Writer Simon Robinson has up-
loaded on YouTube several lectures 
that Henri Bortoft presented on 
wholeness at Schumacher College in 
the 2000s. These lectures are an ex-
cellent introduction to Bortoft’s 
thinking, including his understanding 
of Goethean science. The links are 
below.  
    There is also available a tape re-
cording of Bortoft’s presentation at 
the 2011 J. G. Bennett’s Dramatic 
Universe conference; this link is 
listed below after the Schumacher 
links. Note that, in the early 1960s, 
Bortoft was a researcher under the 
direction of Bennett. 
 




























































Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology (from EAP, 2014 [vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4]) 
 
Questions relating to phenomenology 
and related interpretive approaches 
and methods: 
❖ What is phenomenology and what does 
it offer to whom?  
❖ What is the state of phenomenological 
research today? What are your hopes 
and concerns regarding phenomenol-
ogy? 
❖ Does phenomenology continue to have 
relevance in examining human experi-
ence in relation to world? 
❖ Are there various conceptual and meth-
odological modes of phenomenology 
and, if so, how can they be categorized 
and described? 
❖ Has phenomenological research been 
superseded by other conceptual ap-
proaches—e.g., post-structuralism, so-
cial-constructionism, critical theory, re-
lationalist and non-representational per-
spectives, the various conceptual 
“turns,” and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mak-
ing a better world? If so, what are the 
most crucial phenomena and topics to 
be explored phenomenologically? 
❖ Can phenomenological research offer 
practical results in terms of design, 
planning, policy, and advocacy? 
❖ How might phenomenological insights 
be broadcast in non-typical academic 
ways—e.g., through artistic expression, 
theatrical presentation, digital evoca-
tion, virtual realities, and so forth? 
❖ What are the most important aims for 
future phenomenological research? 
❖ Do the various post-structural and so-
cial-constructionist criticisms of phe-
nomenology—that it is essentialist, 
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist, 
ignorant of power structures, and so 
forth—point toward its demise? 
 
Questions relating to the natural 
world and environmental and ecologi-
cal concerns: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of na-
ture and the natural world? 
❖ What can phenomenology offer the in-
tensifying environmental and ecological 
crises we face today? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to more 
sustainable actions and worlds? 
❖ Can one speak of a sustainable life-
world? 
❖ What is a phenomenology of a lived en-
vironmental ethic and who are the key 
contributors? 
❖ Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a 
role in caring for the natural world? For 
places? For lifeworlds broadly? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to envi-
ronmental education? If so, in what 
ways? 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of the 
two laws of thermodynamics, especially 
the second law claiming that all activi-
ties, left to their own devices, tend to-
ward greater disorder and fewer possi-
bilities? Are there ways whereby phe-
nomenological understanding of life-
world might help to reduce the acceler-
ating disordering of natural and human 
worlds? 
 
Questions relating to place, place ex-
perience, and place meaning: 
❖ Why has the notion of place become an 
important phenomenological topic? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of place contribute to better place mak-
ing? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to a 
generative understanding of place and 
place making? 
❖ What roles do bodily regularity and ha-
bitual inertia play in the constitution of 
place and place experience? 
❖ What are the lived relationships be-
tween place, sustainability, and a re-
sponsive environmental ethic? 
❖ How are phenomenological accounts to 
respond to post-structural interpreta-
tions of space and place as rhizomic and 
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)? 
❖ Can phenomenological accounts incor-
porate a “progressive sense of place” 
argued for by critical theorists like 
Doreen Massey? 
❖ Can phenomenological explications of 
space and place account for human dif-
ferences—gender, sexuality, less-
abledness, social class, cultural back-
ground, and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to the 
politics and ideology of place? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of lived embodiment and habitual iner-
tia be drawn upon to facilitate robust 
places and to generate mutual support 
and understanding among places, espe-
cially places that are considerably dif-
ferent (e.g., different ethnic neighbor-
hoods or regions)? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mo-
bility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic 
spaces, the places of mobility, non-
spaces and their relationship to mobility 
and movement? 
 
Questions relating to architecture and 
environmental design and policy: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of archi-
tecture and architectural experience and 
meaning? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to bet-
ter architectural design? 
❖ How do qualities of the designable 
world—spatiality, materiality, lived 
aesthetics, environmental embodiment 
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds? 
❖ What are the most pertinent environ-
mental and architectural features con-
tributing to a lifeworld’s being one way 
rather than another? 
❖ What role will cyberspace and digital 
technologies have in 21st-century life-
worlds? How will they play a role in 
shaping designed environments, partic-
ularly architecture? 
❖ What impact will digital advances and 
virtual realities have on physical em-
bodiment, architectural design, and 
real-world places? Will virtual reality 
eventually be able to simulate “real re-
ality” entirely? If so, how does such a 
development transform the nature of 
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and ar-
chitecture? 
❖ Can virtual worlds become so “real” 
that they are lived as “real” worlds? 
 
Other potential questions: 
❖ What is the lived relationship between 
people and the worlds in which they 
find themselves? 
❖ Can lifeworlds be made to happen self-
consciously? If so, how? Through what 
individual efforts? Through what group 
efforts? 
❖ Can a phenomenological education in 
lifeworld, place, and environmental em-
bodiment assist citizens and profession-
als in better understand the workings 
and needs of real-world places and 
thereby contribute to their envisioning 
and making? 
❖ Is it possible to speak of human-rights-
in-place or place justice? If so, would 
such a possibility move attention and 
supportive efforts toward improving the 
places in which people and other living 
beings find themselves, rather than fo-
cusing only on the rights and needs of 
individuals and groups without consid-
eration of their place context? 
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